Implicit Redefinitions, Evidentiary Proscriptions, and Guilty Minds: Intoxicated Wrongdoers after Montana v. Egelhoff by Sweitzer, Brett G.
IMPLICIT REDEFINITIONS, EVIDENTIARY PROSCRIPTIONS,
AND GUILTY MINDS: INTOXICATED WRONGDOERS AFTER
MONTANA v. EGELHOFF
BRETT G. SWEITZERt
You heard all about drugs. Sin ain't sin when good folks take a little pill,
smoke a little marijuana. "I really didn't intend to kill that police offi-
cer." I don't buy that and I don't believe you do. A man doesn't take
pills and take dope and drink whiskey and not be accountable for what
he does. That'sjust an excuse.
-From the prosecutor's argument to the jury in Mississippi v. Lanier
INTRODUCTION
In July 1992, James Egelhoff was in northwestern Montana camp-
2ing and picking mushrooms. He carried no personal items save the
clothes he was wearing and a .38-caliber handgun. While camping,
he met two other mushroom harvesters, Roberta Payola and John
Christianson. OnJuly 12, Egelhoff, Payola, and Christianson sold the
mushrooms they had collected, bought some beer, and spent the day
drinking at bars and a private party. Sometime after 9:00 P.M., the
trio left the party and continued drinking while driving around in
Christianson's car.
t B.A. 1993, Colgate University; J.D. Candidate 1998, University of Pennsylvania.
Acknowledgments of helpful comments and overlooked errors are customary. As to
the first, I thank my wife, Lisa Mathewson, for her many insightful comments, and the
editors of the Law Review for their tireless efforts in putting this Comment in order. As
to the second, I adopt the poet's modesty:
I washed thy face, but more defects I saw,
And rubbing off a spot still made a flaw.
I stretched thyjoints to make thee even feet,
Yet still thou run'st more hobbling than is meet.
ANNE BRADSTREET, The Author to Her Book, in THE WORKS OF ANNE BRADSTREET 221,
221 (Jeannine Hensley ed., Belknap Press 1967) (1678).
' See Lanier v. State, 533 So. 2d 473, 479 (Miss. 1988).
2 The factual details presented here are taken from the two appellate opinions in
Egelhoff's case, that of the Supreme Court of Montana in State v. Egelhoff, 900 P.2d 260
(Mont. 1995), and that of the United States Supreme Court in Montana v. Egelhoff, 116
S. Ct. 2013 (1996).
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Shortly before midnight, sheriff's officers responded to reports of
a car, later determined to be Christianson's, being driven erratically.
The officers found Christianson's car in a ditch by the side of the
road. The scene was macabre. Both Christianson and Payola were
dead, Christianson from a gunshot wound to the right back side of his
head, and Pavola from a bullet through her left temple. The two bod-
ies were in the front seat of the car. Egelhoff lay in the back of the
car, alive, intoxicated, and yelling obscenities, with gunshot residue
on his hands. On the floor in front of the driver's seat was Egelhoff's
gun, containing four loaded rounds and two empty casings.
Egelhoff appeared severely intoxicated at the scene. He was
largely incoherent, but repeatedly asked emergency personnel ques-
tions such as "Did you find him?" Egelhoff was taken to the hospital,
where his blood-alcohol level was measured at .36%. The next day,
after Egelhoff sobered up, he remembered nothing about the previ-
ous evening; his last memory was of leaving the party sometime
shortly before dusk. Egelhoff could not recall repeatedly asking
authorities at the scene of the homicides "Did you find him?," nor
could he recall to whom the "him" might refer. A medical doctor
who examined Egelhoff at the hospital later testified at Egelhoff's
trial that Egelhoff had probably suffered alcoholic "blackout."
Montana authorities charged Egelhoff with two counts of deliber-
ate homicide, defined by Montana law as purposely or knowingly
causing the death of another person.3 At trial, Egelhoff maintained
that his extreme intoxication rendered him physically incapable of
committing the homicides and accounted for his inability to remem-
ber that evening's events. Although Egelhoff was permitted to intro-
duce evidence of his intoxication for these purposes, the jury was in-
structed, pursuant to Montana law,4 that it could not take Egelhoff's
3 MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-102 (1997) provides:
(1) A person commits the offense of deliberate homicide if: (a) the person
purposely or knowingly causes the death of another human being; or (b) the
person attempts to commit, commits, or is legally accountable for the attempt
or commission of robbery, sexual intercourse without consent, arson, bur-
glary, kidnapping, aggravated kidnapping, felonious escape, felony assault,
aggravated assault, or any other forcible felony and in the course of the forci-
ble felony or flight thereafter, the person or any person legally accountable
for the crime causes the death of another human being.
(2) A person convicted of the offense of deliberate homicide shall be pun-
ished by death as provided in 46-18-301 through 46-18-310, by life imprison-
ment, or by imprisonment in the state prison for a term of not less than 10
years or more than 100 years, except as provided in 46-18-219 and 46-18-222.
' MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-203 (1997) provides:
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intoxication into account in determining whether he acted purposely
or knowingly as required by Montana's definition of deliberate homi-
cide. The jury found Egelhoff guilty on both counts. He was sen-
tenced to eighty-four years in prison.
On appeal, Egelhoff claimed that the intoxication instruction de-
prived him of due process by removing from the jury's consideration
a fact-his intoxication-relevant to a determination of his mental
state, which was an element of deliberate homicide to be proven by
the state beyond a reasonable doubt. A unanimous Supreme Court of
Montana agreed, reversing Egelhoff's conviction and remanding the
case for a new trial.5 The United States Supreme Court, without a ma-
jority opinion, reversed the decision of the Supreme Court of Mon-
tana and held that Montana's statutory prohibition of the use of in-'
toxication evidence to negate mens rea does not violate the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
6
Egelhoff's case sharply presents a persistent issue in criminal law:
the bearing, if any, of voluntary intoxication on criminal liability. A
thorough examination of this issue must address two related ques-
tions. First, does holding severely intoxicated wrongdoers criminally
liable to the same extent as sober offenders violate due process? Put
8more precisely, does substantive due process require that, at some
A person who is in an intoxicated condition is criminally responsible for his
conduct and an intoxicated condition is not a defense to any offense and may
not be taken into consideration in determining the existence of a mental
state which is an element of the offense unless the defendant proves that he
did not know that it was an intoxicating substance when he consumed,
smoked, sniffed, injected, or otherwise ingested the substance causing the
condition.
5 SeeEgelhoff, 900 P.2d at 266. Twojustices dissented in part on the separate issue
of retroactive applicability. See id. at 269 (Trieweiler, J., specially concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
6 See Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2024 (plurality opinion). Unless specifically noted oth-
erwise, all citations to the U.S. Supreme Court's Egelhoff decision are to the plurality
opinion.
7 I use "wrongdoer" here instead of "offender" to avoid begging the question of
criminal liability. To refer to intoxicated wrongdoers as offenders assumes that such
individuals are, in fact, guilty of the offense, when the point is precisely that some in-
toxicated wrongdoers may not possess the requisite mens rea to be guilty, even though
the actus reus element clearly is satisfied. I will use "intoxicated wrongdoer," then, to
refer to a defendant who causes the harm proscribed by the law, but might not have
possessed the requisite mens rea to be guilty of the offense.
8 This Comment does not consider the official propriety of substantive due proc-
ess review. Although the Supreme Court has often questioned such review, see, e.g.,
Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997) (using scare quotes when speaking of sub-
stantive due process review); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937)
1997]
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theoretical point when an intoxicated wrongdoer's drunkenness pre-
cludes a finding of mens rea, he not be held criminally liable to the
same extent as a sober offender who causes the same harm?
Second, if society may-consistent with substantive due process-
choose to treat intoxicated wrongdoers and sober offenders alike,
does procedural due process nonetheless limit the way in which such
a social judgment may be effectuated? These are the two questions
addressed in this Comment.
In order to set and address these questions effectively, the Com-
ment is divided into five Parts. Part I clarifies two basic distinctions
that limit the scope of the Comment: the common law distinction be-
tween voluntary and involuntary intoxication, and the distinction be-
tween intoxication asserted by a defendant as an affirmative defense
and as a failure of proof claim. Part II reviews the current status of
state law on the issue of voluntary intoxication's bearing on criminal
liability and identifies the current trend toward equal treatment of in-
toxicated wrongdoers and sober offenders, demonstrating the impor-
tance of the issues raised in this Comment.
Part III addresses directly the two principal issues: the substantive
and procedural due process limitations on the criminal liability of in-
toxicated wrongdoers. This Part clarifies the Supreme Court's hold-
ing in Egelhoff, critically examines the Court's reasoning, and poses
some objections to the statutory scheme at issue in that case. Here I
will argue that (1) the culpability requirement of the criminal law
demands that some severely intoxicated wrongdoers be treated dif-
ferently than sober offenders; and (2) even if intoxicated wrongdoers
and sober offenders may be treated alike, procedural due process re-
quires that this be effectuated through the substantive criminal law
rather than through limiting defendants' ability to present intoxica-
tion evidence to rebut the state's prima facie case of criminal liability.
Part IV explores the implications of the Supreme Court's ruling
in Egelhoff for other states' exclusions of voluntary intoxication evi-
dence. Here I examine how other states' exclusionary schemes bear
on the objections to Montana's scheme that were raised in Part III.
Part V suggests a different approach to the treatment of intoxicated
(eschewing Lochner-era substantive due process protection of economic rights), even
the Court's most skeptical Justices have recognized and employed substantive due
.process review. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2267 (1997)
(Rehnquist, CJ.) ("The Due Process Clause guarantees more than fair process ....
The Clause also provides heightened protection against government interference with
certain fundamental rights and liberty interests.").
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wrongdoers. Specifically, this Part briefly outlines an offense of in-
toxicated criminal conduct, and demonstrates how this approach
avoids the due process objections to the exclusionary schemes dis-
cussed in Parts III and IV.
I. Two BASIC DIsTINCrIoNs
Two basic distinctions must be made clear from the outset. First,
the common law traditionally has distinguished voluntary intoxication
from involuntary intoxicatipn.9 Generally, more exculpatory weight is
given to evidence of involuntary intoxication because an involuntarily
intoxicated wrongdoer typically is viewed as morally less culpable than
a voluntarily intoxicated wrongdoer."0 This Comment, is concerned
only with claims of voluntary intoxication, which make up the over-
whelming majority of intoxication-related clains raised by criminal
defendants. A state's treatment of involuntary intoxication is not
completely irrelevant to the arguments presented below," but it will
not be a focus of the discussion. I will therefore use "intoxication" to
mean voluntary intoxication.
Second, there are two fundamental ways in which intoxication
evidence might be presented to mitigate a wrongdoer's criminal li-
ability: as an affirmative defense and as a failure of proof claim. In-
toxication has almost never been recognized as an affirmative de-
fense,' 2 although this has changed to some degree with the
9 Intoxication is generally held to be involuntary if it (1) is coerced; (2) occurs by
innocent mistake; (3) results unexpectedly from prescribed medication; or (4) causes
a temporary psychotic reaction due to the existence of a pre-disposing mental or
physical condition of which the person is unaware. See, e.g., City of Minneapolis v. Al-
timus, 238 N.W.2d 851, 856 (Minn. 1976). Claims of involuntary intoxication are rare.
See, e.g., R.U. Singh, History of the Defence of Drunkenness in English Criminal Law, 49 LAw
Q. REV. 528, 545 n.81 (1933) ("There is no English case where the defence of involun-
tary drunkenness was urged or discussed. The only case where reference is found to it
is Pearson's Case.").
"0 See, e.g., Pearson's Case, 168 Eng. Rep. 1108, 1108 (Carlisle Sp. Assizes 1835) ("If
a party be made drunk by stratagem, or the fraud of another, he is not responsible.");
1 SIR MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CRoWN 32 (London, Sollom
Emlyn 1680) ("[I]f a person by the unskilfulness of his physician, or by the contriv-
ance of his enemies, eat[s] or drink[s] such a thing as causeth such a temporary or
permanent phrenzy... this puts him into the same condition, in reference to crimes,
as any other phrenzy and equally excuseth him.").
" See infra note 146 and accompanying text.
12 The common law did not clearly delineate affirmative defenses from failure of
proof claims, but it is clear that intoxication, to the extent it could exculpate, was
thought to affect the offender's intent. See, e.g., United States v. Roudenbush, 27 F.
Cas. 902, 904 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1832) (No. 16,198) ("Intoxication is no excuse for crime,
1997]
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promulgation of the Model Penal Code. 3 The other potential use of
intoxication evidence is to attack the State's prima facie case by negat-
ing (i.e., establishing a reasonable doubt as to the proof of) an ele-
ment of the offense charged. Although this use is often referred to as
a "defense," and is in a general sense a defense to criminal liability, it
is properly termed a failure of proof claim.
At common law, intoxication evidence was relevant to negate only
the mens rea element of specific intent crimes; the actus reus element
could not be negated, due to the common law fiction that the volun-
tariness of the consumption of the intoxicant "substituted" for the
voluntariness of the offense's actus reus element.
14
The distinction between employing intoxication as an affirmative
defense and using it to support a claim that the State has failed to
prove mens rea is critically important, because these two uses of in-
toxication evidence implicate due process to a differeht extent. In a
criminal prosecution, the State bears the burden of proving every
element of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt. 5 In contrast, a
state may place the burden of persuasion regarding affirmative de-
fenses upon the defendant. 6 A state, therefore, must bear the burden
of disproving beyond a reasonable doubt a defendant's intoxication-
based failure of proof claim, whereas the defendant may be required
to bear the burden of persuasion regarding an affirmative defense of
intoxication, if such a defense exists under state law.
when the offence consists merely in doing a criminal act, without regarding intention.
But when the act done is innocent in itself, and criminal only when done with a cor-
rupt or malicious motive, ajury may, from intoxication, presume that there was a want
of criminal intention .... ").
's See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08(4) (Proposed Official Draft 1962), discussed infra
Part II.B.
14 At its logical extreme, this doctrine has supported the convictions of intoxicated
wrongdoers who were legally unconscious at the time of their offensive conduct. See,
e.g., People v. Velez, 221 Cal. Rptr. 631, 637 (Ct. App. 1985) ('Clearly, then, one who
becomes voluntarily intoxicated to the point of unconsciousness can have no actual
intent to commit a crime; rather, criminal responsibility is justified on the theory that
having chosen to breach one's duty to others of acting with reason and conscience,
one may not entirely avoid criminal harm caused by one's breach of duty.").
" See In reWinship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) ("[T)he Due Process Clause protects
the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every
fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.").
"' See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210 (1977) ("We... decline to adopt as
a constitutional imperative, operative countrywide, that a State must disprove beyond a
reasonable doubt every fact constituting any and all affirmative defenses related to the
culpability of an accused.").
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This Comment is concerned only with the use of intoxication evi-
dence to support a failure of proof claim as to the mens rea element
of a criminal offense. Therefore, the nature and extent of the State's
due process burden to prove mens rea beyond a reasonable doubt is
of central concern.
II. CURRENT LAW AND ITS GENESIS
A. Intoxication Under the Common Law
At early common law, a wrongdoer's intoxication, usually but not
necessarily by way of alcohol, had no effect on his criminal liability;
intoxication neither aggravated nor mitigated the underlying of-
fense. 7 During the nineteenth century, however, a change in the sig-
17 Some early common law authorities claim that intoxication in fact aggravated
the underlying offense. See, e.g., Beverley's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 1118, 1123 (&B. 1603)
("[D]runkenness does not extenuate his act.., nor turn to his avail: but it is a great
offence in itself, and therefore aggravates his offence, and doth not derogate from the
act which he did during that time."); Reniger v. Fogossa, 75 Eng. Rep. 1, 31 (Ex. Ch.
1551) ("[T]hat such a man [who has killed while drunk] deserves double punishment,
because he has doubly offended, viz. in being drunk to the evil example of others, and
in committing the crime of homicide."); 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *25-
26 ("[A]s to artificial, voluntarily contracted madness, by drunkenness or intoxica-
tion ... our law looks upon this as an aggravation of the offence, rather than as an ex-
cuse for any criminal misbehavior.").
Twentieth century commentators suggest that these authorities indicate that in-
toxication may have, at most, led to a greater sentence at common law, not that an in-
toxicated wrongdoer was charged with a more serious crime. See David McCord, The
English and American History of Voluntary Intoxication to Negate Mens Rea, 11 J. LEGAL
HIsT. 372, 374 (1990) (discussing Fogossa and Beverley's Case and concluding that refer-
ences to aggravation "[do] not mean that the crime could be raised to a higher grade
of offense, since there were no higher grades of offenses based on the actor's being
intoxicated"); Singh, supra note 9, at 532 (concluding that reference to intoxication as
aggravating an underlying offense "was little more than rhetorical flourish inspired by
the spirit of the times").
In the United States, the first reported case on the issue held that intoxication had
no effect on criminal liability. See Res Publica v. Weidle, 2 Dall. 88, 91 (Pa. 1781)
("[D]runkenness is no justification, or excuse, for committing the offence."); see also
McCord, supra, at 375 ("[T]he earliest American authority stands for the proposition
that intoxication does not affect culpability."). Subsequent American cases confirmed
this view. See, e.g., McIntyre v. People, 38 Ill. 514, 520 (1865) ("That [drunkenness] is
no excuse is certainly true, but that it should be held in law to aggravate crime is not,
we conceive, a correct proposition.").
Other English common law authorities support this latter view. See, e.g., MICHAEL
DALTON, THE COUNTRY JUSTICE 299 (London, William Rawlins & Samuel Roycroft
1690) ("[I]f a man that is drunk, killeth another, that is felony of death; for it is a vol-
untary ignorance in him."); HALE, supra note 10, at 32 (noting that a person commit-
ting homicide while drunk "shall have no privilege by this voluntary contracted mad-
ness, but shall have the same judgment as if he were in his right senses"); 1 RICHARD
19971
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nificance given a wrongdoer's intoxication was brought about by two
competing concerns: the emerging judgment that some intoxicated
wrongdoers may not be as morally culpable as sober offenders, and
the continuing belief that voluntarily intoxicated wrongdoers should
not totally escape the consequences of their harmful conduct. These
concerns, together with new pharmacological theories about intoxica-
tion, brought about a reconceptualization of offenses into two catego-
ries: "specific intent" crimes and "general intent" crimes.'8  Using
these labels, common law courts developed the rule that voluntary in-
toxication could negate the mens rea element of specific intent
crimes, but not of general intent crimes.' 9 This approach resulted
from a general amelioration of the harsh English common law (which
provided for capital punishment for a wide variety of offenses),
checked by courts' refusal to allow intoxication to mitigate second
degree murder to manslaughter.2° The specific intent/general intentdistinction was embraced by nearly all American jurisdictions by the
HOOKER, OF THE LAWS OF THE EccLsIAsTIcAL POLITY 186 (J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd.
1965) (1593) ("It is no excuse therefore unto him, who being drunk... allegeth that
his wits were not his own.").
'8 See People v. Hood, 462 P.2d 370, 377-78 (Cal. 1969) (discussing the common
law development of specific intent and general intent crimes); McCord, supra note 17,
at 379-82. Although the distinction between specific and general intent crimes is no-
toriously vague, the common law courts developing these categories defined general
intent crimes as those crimes that require only the intention to do the actus reus of
the crime and defined specific intent crimes as those crimes that require some further
intention in addition to the intention to do the actus reus of the crime. See Hood, 462
P.2d at 378; see alsoJOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 10.06 (2d ed.
1995).
'9 See, e.g., Director of Pub. Prosecutions v. Majewski, 2 All E.R. 142, 149 (Eng. H.L.
1976) (stating that case law from 1920 onward has made it clear that "it is only in the
limited class of cases requiring proof of specific intent that drunkeness can excul-
pate").
20 See Hood, 462 P.2d at 377-78; McCord, supra note 17, at 379-81 (discussing Pitle v.
State, 28 Tenn. (9 Hum.) 663 (1849), the first American case in which a court distin-
guished between intoxication's exculpatory effect on second-degree murder versus
manslaughter). Later courts relied on this distinction to develop the specific in-
tent/general intent dichotomy and distinguish intoxication's exculpatory effect on
the two classes of crimes. See, e.g., State v.Johnson, 41 Conn. 584 (1874).
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mid-twentieth century, and continues to define the exculpatory ef-fect of intoxication in twenty-two states today. 2
B. Other Contemporary Approaches to Intoxication
The promulgation of the Model Penal Code ("MPC") by the
American Law Institute in 1962 marked the first uniform shift in the
exculpatory effect given voluntary intoxication. Eschewing the com-
mon law's specific intent/general intent dichotomy, the drafters of
the MPC gave intoxication evidence its full logical exculpatory effect
by allowing it to negate the mens rea element of all offenses,2 except
for offenses requiring the mens rea of recklessness.24 Also, for the
first time, the MPC recognized pathological intoxication 2 as an af-
firmative defense, but only if the defendant's consequent incapacity
2, Three states resisted moving to the specific intent/general intent approach, re-
taining the original common law approach instead. See Choice v. State, 31 Ga. 424
(1860) (codified at GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-4 (1996)); Schaller v. State, 14 Mo. 502
(1851) (codified at Mo. REV. STAT. § 562.076 (Supp. 1997)); Harris v. State, 169 S.W.
657 (Tex. Crim. App. 1914) (codified at TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.04 (West 1994)).
2 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 22(B) (West 1995); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-804(1)
(1986); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/6-3 (a) (West 1993); IOWA CODE § 701.5 (1993);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3208(2) (1995); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:15(2) (West 1997);
MINN. STAT. § 609.075 (1994); NEV. REv. STAT. § 193.220 (1997); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 22-5-5 (Michie 1988); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.16.090 (West 1988); Wyo. STAT.
ANN. § 6-1-202(a) (Michie 1988); Gardner v. State, 480 So. 2d 91 (Fla. 1985); Shell v.
State, 512 A.2d 358 (Md. 1986); Commonwealth v. Henson, 476 N.E.2d 947 (Mass.
1985); People v. Savoie, 349 N.W.2d 139 (Mich. 1984); State v. Cain, 393 N.W.2d 727
(Neb. 1986); State v. Brown, 931 P.2d 69, 74-75 (N.M. 1996); State v. Kirkley, 302
S.E.2d 144 (N.C. 1983), overruled on other grounds by State v. Shank, 367 S.E.2d 639 (N.C.
1988); State v. Fox, 428 N.E.2d 410 (Ohio 1981); Edwards v. State, 655 P.2d 1048
(Okla. Crim. App. 1982); State v. Doyon, 416 A.2d 130 (R.I. 1980); State v. Keeton, 272
S.E.2d 817 (W. Va. 1980).
23 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08 cmt. 1 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) ("If the
mental state which is the basis of the law's concern does not exist, the reason for its
nonexistence is quite plainly immaterial.").
24 See id. § 2.08. This hedging evidences the drafters' concerns about the moral
culpability of intoxicated wrongdoers and their conflicting concerns about the need to
punish those wrongdoers, the two competing concerns that originally motivated
common law courts to develop the specific intent/general intent dichotomy.
2 The MPC defines "pathological intoxication" as "intoxication grossly excessive
in degree, given the amount of the intoxicant, to which the actor does not know he is
susceptible." MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08(5) (c) (1985).
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rose to the level of insanity as defined in the MPC.26 Presently, four-
teen states follow some version of the MPC approach.2
Despite the influence of the MPC, a second shift in the treatment
of intoxicated wrongdoers has occurred in recent years. This shift
harks back to the original common law approach, whereby intoxica-
tion was excluded altogether from the mens rea inquiry and made ir-
relevant to an offender's criminal liability.28 Only three states have
continuously followed this exclusionary approach,2 but nine more
have recently joined their ranks, and eight others are considering a
similar change.0 In addition, two states limit the exculpatory effect of
intoxication to the negation of the premeditation element of first-de-
gree murder.3'
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08(4) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). Prior to the
promulgation of the MPC, intoxication "defenses" took the form of failure of proof
claims. See supra Part I.
217 See ALA. CODE § 13A-3-2 (1996); ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.630 (Michie 1996); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-7 (West 1994); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 501.080 (Michie 1995);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17A, § 37 (West 1983); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 626:4 (1996);
N.J. REV. STAT. § 2C:2-8 (1995); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.25 (McKinney 1987); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 12.1-04-02 (1989); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.125 (1994);TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-
503 (1983); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-306 (1993); Wis. STAT. § 939.42 (1993); State v.
Galvin, 514 A.2d 705 (Vt. 1986).
See supra note 17.
29 See supra note 21.
50 In addition to Georgia, Missouri, and Texas, nine states have returned to the
original common law approach. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-503 (West Supp. 1996)
(previously an MPC state); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-207 (Michie 1993) (previously a spe-
cific intent/general intent state); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 421 (1995) (previously a
specific intent/general intent state); HAW. REV. STAT. § 702-230 (Supp. 1992)
(previously an MPC state); IDAHO CODE § 18-116 (Supp. 1997) (previously a specific
intent/general intent state); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-41-2-5, -3-5 (West Supp. 1997)
(previously allowing intoxication to negate the mens rea element of all crimes);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-203 (1997) (previously an MPC state); Lanier v. State, 533 So.
2d 473 (Miss. 1988) (previously a specific intent/general intent state); State v. Vaughn,
232 S.E.2d 328 (S.C. 1977) (previously a specific intent/general intent state).
Eight more states currently are considering a return to the original common law
approach. See S.B. 579, 1997-1998 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1997); S.B. 168, 15th Leg., 1st Reg.
Sess. (Fla. 1997); H.B. 2310, 77th Leg., 1997 Reg. Sess. (Kan. 1997); S.B. 339, 69th Reg.
Sess. (Nev. 1997); H.B. 1009, 43d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (N.M. 1997); H.B. 2441, 69th
Leg., 1997 Reg. Sess. (Or. 1997); S.B. 857, 1997-1998 Reg. Sess. (Pa. 1997); H.B. 1672,
55th Leg., 1997 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1997).
SI See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 308 (West 1994); Gills v. Commonwealth, 126 S.E.
51 (Va. 1925) ("[W]here a party is charged with murder, if it appear that the accused
was too drunk to be capable of deliberating and premeditating, then he can be con-
victed only of murder in the second degree."). But see S.B. 1120, 1995-1996 Reg. Sess.
(Pa. 1995) (providing for repeal of Pennsylvania's murder exception).
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The motivation behind this recent resurgence of the original
common law approach is difficult to isolate. The familiar supporting
arguments of deterrence, incapacitation, and simple retribution are
long-standing."2 One possible explanation is that a general trend to-
ward recognition of "victims' rights" is motivating state legislatures to
curb the exculpatory effect of intoxication. Regardless of the rea-
sons for the new-found popularity of the original common law ap-
proach, an increasing number of states are legislating it.
III. THE DUE PROCESS INQUIRY
A. Questions Raised by the Current Trend Toward Denying
Intoxication Any Exculpatory Effect
The recent trend toward treating intoxication as irrelevant to
criminal liability raises two important sets of questions. First, does it
violate substantive due process to hold severely intoxicated wrongdo-
ers criminally liable to the same extent as sober offenders? I refer to
this as the criminalization question because it asks whether a state
may, consistent with substantive due process, redefine the elements of
crimes so as to render intoxication evidence irrelevant to criminal li-
ability.
Second, if the criminalization decision does not violate substan-
tive due process, does procedural due process nonetheless require
that the criminalization judgment be embodied in a state's substan-
tive law, rather than in an evidentiary proscription? I refer to this as
the procedural question because it asks whether it matters how a state
effectuates its substantive criminalization judgments. Subsumed in
52 See, e.g., McDaniel v. State, 356 So. 2d 1151, 1160-61 (Miss. 1978) ("[I]f a person
casts off the restraints of reason and consciousness by a voluntary act, no wrong is
done to him if he is held accountable for any crimes which he may commit in that
condition."); State v. Stasio, 396 A.2d 1129, 1134 (N.J. 1979) ("[Allowing intoxication
to have an exculpatory effect] undermines the criminal law's primary function of pro-
tecting society from the results of behavior that endangers the public safety."); Note,
Intoxication as a Criminal Defense 55 COLUM. L. REV. 1210, 1218 (1955) (offering gen-
eral deterrence as an explanation for limiting intoxication's exculpatory effect).
sThis trend seems to be a motivating factor behind Florida's current reconsidera-
tion of its approach to intoxicated wrongdoers. See, e.g., H.B. 417, 15th Leg., 1st Reg.
Sess. (Fla. 1997) (finding that sentence reductions based on intoxication should be
prohibited because "the victim, whose injuries are no less real and painful because the
defendant injured the victim while abusing or while addicted to a substance, and who
bears no responsibility for the defendant engaging in such irresponsible behavior, has
a reasonable interest in the trial court's applying the full measure of the law when the
defendant is convicted of a crime against the victim").
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the procedural question is a secondary question: Is there any consti-
tutional difference between explicitly redefining a state's substantive
criminal law and "implicitly redefining" the law simply by prohibiting
defendants from offering evidence otherwise relevant to rebut the
State's prima facie case of criminal liability?
Underlying these two principal sets of questions is a normative
question: Should intoxication be irrelevant to criminal liability? Put
differently, does this treatment of intoxicated wrongdoers achieve the
social goals it purports to serve? What are these goals, and by whom
are they recognized?3' Given present scientific knowledge of intoxica-
tion's pharmacological effect, might this treatment of intoxicated
wrongdoers transgress a sense of fairness that is short of due process?
Is there any better (that is, more effective or fairer) way to achieve the
relevant social goals?
In this Part, I argue that (1) the culpability requirement of the
criminal law demands that some severely intoxicated wrongdoers be
treated differently than sober offenders; and (2) even if all intoxi-
cated wrongdoers constitutionally may be treated the same as sober
offenders, procedural due process requires that this treatment be ef-
fectuated through the substantive criminal law rather than by limiting
a defendant's ability to present intoxication evidence to rebut the
State's prima facie case of criminal liability.
B. Montana v. Egelhoff
As discussed briefly above, in Montana v. Egelhoffs5 the Supreme
Court upheld against a due process challenge Montana's statutory
prohibition on the admission of intoxication evidence for the pur-
pose of negating the mens rea element of the crime charged . Be-
cause the reasoning of the Supreme Court of Montana is central to
the holding of the United States Supreme Court, it is briefly ad-
dressed before examining the Supreme Court's ruling.
"' This question is particularly relevant when one considers that, of the 14 states
that treat intoxication as irrelevant to proof of mens rea, only seven (including Mon-
tana) do so pursuant to specific statutory authority. See infra note 175 and accompany-
ing text. The courts of four other states have adopted this approach through interpre-
tations of more general statutory provisions, see infra note 187 and accompanying text,
and three states have made intoxication irrelevant by judicial decision, see infra note
193 and accompanying text.
*" 116 S. Ct. 2013 (1996).
See MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-203 (1997) (Montana's exclusionary statute); see
also supra note 4.
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1. Supreme Court of Montana
The Supreme Court of Montana made clear that it was not con-
sidering, nor was it asked to consider, whether Egelhoff had a due
process right to an affirmative defense of voluntary intoxication.7 In-
stead, the sole issue decided by the court was whether prohibiting
Egelhoff from introducing intoxication evidence for the purpose of
negating the mens rea element of deliberate homicide violated due
process. The court held that Montana's exclusionary statute pre-
cluded Egelhoff from rebutting the State's prima facie case, thereby
impermissibly relieving the State of part of its burden to prove all
elements of deliberate homicide beyond a reasonable doubt."
At trial, the State offered a significant amount of evidence tend-
ing to prove that Egelhoff acted purposely or knowingly in killing the
victims. For instance, the State introduced evidence suggesting the
following: that Egelhoff had to remove the gun from the glove com-
partment of Christianson's car before committing the homicides; that
Egelhoff attempted to flee after the car ran off the road; that he tried
to avoid detection at least twice when witnesses at the scene ap-
proached the car; that a stick was found in the car, which would have
allowed Egelhoff to operate the car's accelerator from the back seat;
that Egelhoff did not appear intoxicated at a supermarket at 9:20
p.m. on the night of the homicides; and that, at the time the car was
discovered, Egelhoff had physical strength and coordination, and was
able to converse with emergency personnel.
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Montana, Egelhoff argued
that, because he was prohibited from introducing evidence of his in-
toxication to the jury, the State was relieved of its burden of proving
the mens rea element of deliberate homicide beyond a reasonable
doubti4 The State's response was two-fold: (1) Egelhoff was not
prejudiced because he was able to introduce intoxication evidence to
show that he was physically incapable of committing the homicides
and to explain his memory loss; and (2) due process was not violated
because the jury was specifically instructed that the state had the bur-
den of proving beyond a reasonable doubt all elements of deliberate
homicide.
37 See State v. Egelhoff, 900 P.2d 260, 264 (Mont. 1995).
' See id. at 265.
39 See id.
" See id. at 264.
41 See id.
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The Supreme Court of Montana began its analysis by holding that
the intoxication evidence proffered by Egelhoff was relevant to the
issue of whether he acted purposely or knowingly.42 The court then
relied on Martin v. Ohio,4s in which the United States Supreme Court
held that placing the burden of proving self-defense on the defen-
dant does not violate due process. In dictum, the Martin Court noted:
It would be quite different if the jury had been instructed that self-
defense evidence could not be considered in determining whether
there was a reasonable doubt about the State's case, i.e., that self-defense
evidence must be put aside for all purposes unless it satisfied the pre-
ponderance standard. Such an instruction would relieve the State of its
burden and plainly run afoul of Winship's mandate [that the state bears
the burden of proving every element of an offense beyond a reasonable
doubt] .44
The Supreme Court of Montana analogized from this passage in
Martin that preventing Egelhoff's jury from considering the intoxica-
tion evidence relieved the prosecution of its burden of proving the
mens rea element of deliberate homicide beyond a reasonable
doubt.45 The court further noted that the exclusionary instruction
may have misled the jury into believing that the State had, in fact,
proved the mens rea element beyond a reasonable doubt. In a sweep-
ing statement of its holding, the court declared: 'We conclude that
the defendant had a due process right to present and have consid-
ered by the jury all relevant evidence to rebut the State's evidence on
all elements of the offense charged."
46
2. United States Supreme Court
A badly divided United States Supreme Court reversed the Su-
preme Court of Montana, stating, in the plurality's words, "[tihe peo-
ple of Montana have decided to resurrect the rule of an earlier era,
disallowing consideration of voluntary intoxication when a defen-
dant's state of mind is at issue. Nothing in the Due Process Clause
prevents them from doing so .... ",s' Justice Scalia wrote the plurality
opinion, which claimed four votes. Justice O'Connor authored the
12 See id. at 265 ("It is clear that [evidence of Egelhoff's level of intoxication] was
relevant to the issue of whether Egelhoff acted knowingly and purposely . .
43 480 U.S. 228 (1987).
44 Id. at 233-34 (citing In reWinship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970)).
4- Egelhoff, 900 P.2d at 266.
46 Id.
47 Montana v. Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. 2013, 2024 (1996).
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lead dissent, which Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer joined. In
addition, Justices Souter and Breyer authored separate dissents. The
fifth vote for the judgment was cast by Justice Ginsburg, who con-
curred in the judgment, but not in the plurality opinion.
Two competing positions emerge from the five opinions. First,
the plurality argued that states have near-plenary authority over the
administration of criminal justice, checked only by the Due Process
Clause's proscription of criminal justice procedures that "'offend[]
some principle ofjustice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of
our people as to be ranked as fundamental."'4 8 According to the plu-
rality, then, Egelhoff's task was "to establish that a defendant's right
to have a jury consider evidence of his voluntary intoxication in de-
termining whether he possesses the requisite mental state is a
'fundamental principle of justice.'4 . After reviewing the original
common law approach treating intoxication as irrelevant to criminal
liability, and the nineteenth century repudiation of this approach, the
plurality concluded that:
Although the rule allowing a jury to consider evidence of a defendant's
voluntary intoxication where relevant to mens rea has gained consider-
able acceptance [since the late nineteenth -century], it is of too recent
vintage, and has not received sufficiently uniform and permanent alle-
giance to qualify as fundamental, especially since it displaces a lengthy
common-law tradition which remains supported by valid [policy] justifi-
cations today.50
The plurality went on to criticize the Montana Supreme Court's
reliance on Martin, noting first that the pertinent language from Mar-
tin was dictum and, second, that the isslie in Martin was a defendant's
right to put on evidence of self-defense, a right that might well be
"fundamental."5'
The second position, articulated in Justice O'Connor's dissent,
would consider Montana's exclusionary statute constitutional only if
the statute "implicitly redefined" the mens rea element of deliberate
homicide so as to render intoxication evidence irrelevant to criminal
liability.52 This approach was adopted by a five-vote majority-the
four dissenters and Justice Ginsburg, who concurred in the judgment
announced by the plurality. Under this line of argument, "a State
48 Id. at 2017 (quoting Patterson v. NewYork, 432 U.S. 197, 201-02 (1977)).
49 Id.
0 Id. at 2021.
SId. at 2023.
52 Id. at 2031, (O'ConnorJ., dissenting).
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may so define the mental element of an offense that evidence of a de-
fendant's voluntary intoxication at the time of commission does not
have exculpatory relevance and, to that extent, may be excluded
without raising any issue of due process."5  However, if Montana did
not intend or implicitly achieve a redefinition of deliberate homicide
through its exclusionary statute, due process requires that the State
not prohibit, without valid justification, the defendant's introduction
of relevant, exculpatory intoxication evidence.5
All four dissenters concluded that (1) the Supreme Court of
Montana held that Montana's exclusionary statute does not redefine
the mens rea element of deliberate homicide, and that this determi-
nation of state law is unreviewable by the United States Supreme
Court;55 and (2) in the absence of a redefinition of deliberate homi-
cide, Montana had not put forth a valid justification for excluding the
intoxication evidence.56
Justice Ginsburg, concurring in the judgment, adopted the dis-
sent's approach but concluded that Montana's exclusionary statute in
fact implicitly redefined the mens rea element of deliberate homi-
cide, changing it from "purposely or knowingly" to "under circum-
stances that would otherwise establish knowledge or purpose 'but for'
s' Id. at 2032 (Souter,J., dissenting).
See id. at 2027 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("A state legislature certainly has the
authority to identify the elements of the offenses it wishes to punish, but once its laws
are written, a defendant has the right to insist that the State prove beyond a reason-
able doubt every element of an offense charged.").
" Federal courts are bound by state courts' interpretations of state law. See, e.g.,
Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 481 & n.5 (1981) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (citing cases for this "well-established" proposition). But see Larry
Alexander, The Supreme Court, Dr. Jekyll, and the Due Process of Proof, 1996 SUP. Cr. REV.
191, 208-09 (1997) (acknowledging the binding effect on federal courts of state court
determinations of state law, but opining in reference to Egelhoff that "when the only
effect the Montana Supreme Court's 'interpretation' of state law will have is how the
federal Due Process Clause applies to state law, that court should have no power to
bind the federal courts to its interpretation").
Although the Supreme Court of Montana relied on the Federal Due Process
Clause in Egelhoff, its interpretation of Montana's exclusionary statute clearly would
affect the applicability of Montana's due process clause, MONT. CONST. art. II, § 17.
This limits the import of Professor Alexander's position. In fact, the Supreme Court
of Montana has signaled its willingness to reaffirm its decision in Egelhoff under the
Montana Constitution. See Byers v. Mahoney, 929 P.2d 202, 205 (Mont. 1996)
("Although we have declined to readdress Egelhoff at this time, this does not preclude
our review of Egelhoff on adequate and independent state grounds under the appro-
priate circumstances.").
SeeEgelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2028-29, 2031 (O'ConnorJ, dissenting).
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[the defendant's] voluntary intoxication. "57 Justice Ginsburg con-
cluded that, "[c]omprehended as a measure redefining mens rea,
[Montana's exclusionary statute] encounters no constitutional
shoal."'
The four-vote plurality viewed the implicit redefinition inquiry as
superfluous. According to the plurality, the legislature's judgment
that intoxication is irrelevant to criminal liability "may be imple-
mented... with equal legitimacy by amending the substantive re-
quirements for each crime, or by simply excluding intoxication evi-
dence from the trial."59
C. The Due Process Analysis
As one might expect, it is difficult to say what "law" comes out of
Egelhoff. At the end of the day, there are seven votes for the proposi-
tion that a state may treat intoxicated wrongdoers criminally liable to
the same extent as sober offenders by implicitly redefining the mens
rea element of its criminal offenses. 6° A clear majority of the Court
therefore answered the criminalization question in the affirmative: A
state may, consistent with substantive due process, treat severely in-
toxicated wrongdoers and sober offenders alike. In addition, five Jus-
tices6' construed Montana's exclusionary statute as effecting an im-
plicit redefinition of the state's substantive criminal law, even over the
unanimous protest of the state's highest court.
The four dissenters refused to read Montana's exclusionary stat-
ute as an implicit redefinition of the mens rea element of deliberate
homicide and would have held that a criminalization judgment effec-
tuated through an evidentiary proscription can, and in Egelhoff did,
violate procedural due process. Although Justice Ginsburg agreed
with the dissenters on this point, her liberal reading of Montana's ex-
clusionary statute as an implicit redefinition of the state's substantive
criminal law severely limits the practical import of her agreement with
the dissent.
57 Id. at 2024 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in thejudgment) (quoting Brief for Ameri-
can Alliance for Rights and Responsibilities et al. as Amicus Curiae at 6 (No. 95-566)).
" Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment).
'9 Id. at 2020-21 n.4. (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment).
'0 Justices Breyer and Stevens reserved judgment on this proposition. See infra
note 62 and accompanying text.
61 The five Justices are the plurality (Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia,
Kennedy, and Thomas) and the concurrence (Justice Ginsburg).
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Egelhoff holds, then, that a statute that prohibits the admission of
intoxication evidence satisfies due process if (liberally read) it redefines
the mens rea element of a crime so as to render intoxication irrelevant to
criminal liability.
1. The Criminalization Question
Justices Breyer and Stevens reserved judgment on whether a state
may define the mens rea element of a crime so as to make intoxica-
tion evidence irrelevant to guilt.62 The other seven Justices declared,
with little argument, that such a criminal statute is constitutional.6 In
fact, Justice Ginsburg viewed this as the sole and determinative issue
in the case:
Beneath the labels (rule excluding evidence or redefinition of the
offense) lies the essential question: Can a State, without offense to the
Federal Constitution, make the judgment that two people are equally
culpable where one commits an act stone sober, and the other engages
in the same conduct after his voluntary intoxication has reduced his ca-
pacity for self control?64
The plurality, too, viewed the criminalization question as deter-
minative, although its due process analysis approached the constitu-
tionality of Montana's exclusionary statute as an evidentiary proscrip-
tion rather than as an implicit redefinition of Montana's substantive
criminal law.65
62 SeeEgelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2035 (Breyer,J., dissenting).
'3 See id. at 2024 ("The people of Montana have decided to resurrect the rule of an
earlier era, disallowing consideration of voluntary intoxication when a defendant's
state of mind is at issue. Nothing in the Due Process Clause prevents them from doing
so . . . ."); id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment) ("Comprehended as a meas-
ure redefining mens rea, § 45-2-203 encounters no constitutional shoal."); id. at 2031
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("If the Montana legislature chose to redefine [deliberate
homicide] so as to alter the requisite mental-state element, the due process problem
presented in this case would not be at issue."); id. at 2032 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("I
have no doubt that a State may so define the mental element of an offense that evi-
dence of a defendant's voluntary intoxication at the time of commission does not have
exculpatory relevance and, to that extent, may be excluded without raising any issue of
due process.").
Id. at 2024 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in thejudgment).
The plurality viewed a redefinition of a substantive crime and an evidentiary
proscription as equally legitimate means to render intoxication irrelevant to criminal
liability. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. The plurality subsumes the crimi-
nalization argument under its due process analysis of § 45-2-203 as an evidentiary pro-
scription, "simply because that is how the Supreme Court of Montana chose to analyze
it." Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2020 n.4.
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a. The Culpability Requirement in Criminal Law
The general principle that criminal liability should be based on
moral culpability, and thus predicated on intentional conduct, is
deeply rooted in Anglo-American criminal law.6 This principle is
embodied in the presumption against strict liability in the criminal
context, perhaps most articulately stated nearly fifty years ago by Jus-
ticeJackson:
The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when in-
flicted by intention is no provincial or transient notion. It is as universal
and persistent in mature systems of law as belief in freedom of the hu-
man will and a consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to
choose between good and evil. A relation between some mental ele-
ment and punishment for a harmful act is almost as instinctive as the
child's familiar exculpatory "But I didn't mean to," and has afforded the
rational basis for a tardy and unfinished substitution of deterrence and
reformation in place of retaliation and vengeance as the motivation for
public prosecution.
67
Despite this strong intellectual commitment to the notion that
criminal liability must be premised on a guilty mind, the Court has
See 2 JAMES FrIZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND
97, 123 (Burt Franklin 1964) (1883) (ranking intention as a condition of criminal li-
ability, but recognizing manslaughter as based on negligent omission); see also Dennis
v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 500 (1951) ("The existence of a mens rea is the rule of,
rather than the exception to, the principles of Anglo-American criminal jurispru-
dence."); Jerome Hall, Negligent Behavior Should Be Excluded from Penal Liability, 63
COLUM. L. REv. 632, 634-43 (1963) (discussing historical, ethical, and scientific rea-
sons for requiring intentional conduct for criminal liability); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The
Aims of the CriminalLaw, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 423 (1958) ("In the tradition
of Anglo-American law, guilt of crime is personal. The main body of the criminal law,
from the Constitution on down, makes sense on no other assumption."); John Calvin
Jeffries, Jr. & Paul B. Stephan III, Defenses, Presumptions, and Burden of Proof in the Ciimi-
nal Law, 88 YALE L.J. 1325, 1376 (1979) ("As a question of principle.., there can be
little doubt of the morally objectionable character of liability without fault or of its in-
consistency with the traditional Anglo-American concept of fairness to the individ-
ual."). But see George P. Fletcher, The Theory of Criminal Negligence: A Comparative
Analysis, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 401, 408-26 (1971) (arguing that negligence may form the
basis of criminal liability).
67 Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250-51 (1952) (footnotes omitted); see
also MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.05 cmt. 1 (1985) ("This section makes a frontal attack
on ... strict liability in the penal law, whenever the offense carries the possibility of
criminal conviction, for which a sentence of probation or imprisonment may be im-
posed.... Crime does and should mean condemnation and no court should have to
pass thatjudgment unless it can declare that the defendant's act was culpable. This is
too fundamental to be compromised." (footnote omitted)).
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never constitutionalized this principle.6 In fact, the Court has upheld
the imposition of strict liability in prosecutions under public welfare
statutes6 and as to the so-called jurisdictional elements of offenses."
Add to these examples the traditional exceptions to the mens rea re-
71quirement the common law made for statutory rape, felony mur-
der,7 and involuntary manslaughter,73 and it becomes clear that the
mens rea "requirement," although persistent in theory, has not been
held by the Court to be a requirement of substantive due process.
b. "Negligent Deliberate" Homicide
Montana's exclusionary statute does not, of course, impose a strict
liability standard for deliberate homicide. Justice Ginsburg,
prompted by amicus, suggested that it imposes a standard of "under
circumstances that would otherwise establish knowledge or purpose
'but for' [the defendant's] voluntary intoxication."7 4 This formula-
tion of the mens rea element, while technically accurate, is too in-
nocuous; "but for a defendant's intoxication" goes a long way in
6' See, e.g., Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 535 (1968) (stating that the Court "has
never articulated a general constitutional doctrine of mens rea"); Lambert v. California,
355 U.S. 225, 228 (1957) ("We do not go with Blackstone in saying that 'a vicious will'
is necessary to constitute a crime... for conduct alone without regard to the intent of
the doer is often sufficient."); Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 66, at 1374
("Constitutional acceptance of a requirement of culpability... is at best uncertain.").
'9 See United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 252 (1922) ("Many instances of [strict
liability] are to be found in regulatory measures in the exercise of what is called the
police power where the emphasis of the statute is evidently upon achievement of some
social betterment rather than the punishment of the crimes as in cases of mala in se.").
" See United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 685 (1975) ("The concept of criminal
intent does not extend so far as to require that the [offender] understand not only the
nature of his act but also its consequence for the choice of ajudicial forum.").
71 See Regina v. Prince, 2 L.R.-Cr. Cas. Res. 154, 163 (Eng. Cr. Cas. Res. 1875)
(finding that some prohibited acts may be classified as crimes even "in the absence of
the knowledge or intent supposed necessary to constitute a mens rea"); see also People
v. Olsen, 685 P.2d 52, 57 (Cal. 1984) (en banc) (asserting that "a reasonable mistake as
to the [statutory rape] victim's age would not be a defense").
72 See Regina v. Sern6, 16 Cox Crim. Cas. 311, 313 (Eng. Cent. Crim. Ct. 1887)
("[A]ny act known to be dangerous to life, and likely in itself to cause death done for
the purpose of committing a felony which caused death, should be murder."); see also
People v. Stamp, 82 Cal. Rptr. 598, 603 (Ct. App. 1969) ("[A] felon is held strictly li-
able for all killings committed by him or his accomplices in the course of the felony.").
" See, e.g., State v. Powell, 426 S.E.2d 91, 95 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993) (noting that
"violation of [a] statute designed for the protection of others is negligence per se"
(citation omitted)).
74 Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2024 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting




transforming the actual intent required to convict a defendant of de-
liberate homicide. Assuming that severe intoxication can, as a phar-
macological matter, prevent the subjective formulation of
"knowledge" or "purpose, 75 the standard recognized by Justice Gins-
burg is negligence. If the defendant had acted reasonably (i.e., had
he not been intoxicated), he would not have caused the death for
which he is prosecuted. According to Justice Ginsburg, the pivotal
vote in Egelhoff, Montana has permissibly established a negligence
standard for deliberate homicide. This stretches beyond the breaking
point the tenuous practice of imposing criminal liability absent a
showing of subjective intent.
Although establishing a negligence standard for homicide is
nothing new7 designating such a crime deliberate homicide-which
in Montana, as in many states, is a capital crime 77--is remarkable in-
deed.7 The very notion of a crime of "negligent deliberate homicide"
75 The scientific evidence on this point is notoriously sketchy. Even if medical
knowledge concerning the pharmacological effects of intoxicants were more com-
plete, whether intoxication can prevent the formation of intent would still be depend-
ent on conclusively defining what one means by "intent." Many commentators argue
that the vast majority of intoxicated wrongdoers "intend" the harms they cause. See,
e.g., Jerome Hall, Intoxication and Ciminal Responsibility, 57 HARV. L. REV. 1045, 1065
(1944) ("[I]ntent is present in harms by inebriates; typically what is lacking is control
and ethical sensitivity."); StephenJ. Morse, Undiminished Confusion in Diminished Capac-
ity, 75J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 16-18 (1984) (concluding that intoxication rarely,
if ever, renders a person incapable of forming intent).
This position, even if correct in some sense, does not end the inquiry. As Hall ex-
plains, "the salient fact [is] that there was never an intent to kill or seriously injure by a sober
person." Hall, supra, at 1065. As other respected authorities have put it, "what is crucial
to the assessment of the moral culpability of the intoxicated offender, then, is not ab-
sence of intent.., but absence of an intent formed by a rational mind." HERBERT
FINGARETrE & ANN HASSE, MENTAL DISABILrrIES AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILiTY 99
(1979).
76 See, e.g., State v. Williams, 484 P.2d 1167, 1171 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971) (applying
standard of ordinary (tort) negligence to affirm conviction of manslaughter); MODEL
PENAL CODE § 210.4 (1985) (defining negligent homicide to require a gross deviation
from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the actor's situa-
tion).
. See MONT. CODEANN. § 45-5-102(2) (1997) (designating deliberate homicide a
capital crime).
78 Remarkable, but not unprecedented. The felony murder rule theoretically can
have the same effect. See, e.g., People v. Washington, 402 P.2d 130, 133 (Cal. 1965)
("The purpose of the felony-murder rule is to deter felons from killing negligently or
accidentally by holding them strictly responsible for killings they commit."). More
over, not even the actus reus requirement need actually be fulfilled for felony murder
liability to apply. See, e.g., People v. Hernandez, 624 N.E.2d 661, 662 (N.Y. 1993)
(upholding a robber's felony murder conviction where a police officer was fatally shot
by another police officercduring the course of a gun battle with the robber).
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seems nonsensical. It is unlikely that the Montana legislature in-
tended to create such a crime. If the legislature had intended this re-
sult, why would it retain the express subjective mens rea element of
deliberate homicide?9 Whether resulting from legislative sleight of
hand or the legislature's failure to appreciate the change wrought in
the substantive law by its exclusionary statute, the end result is a neg-
ligence standard for deliberate homicide, thinly disguised by a dejure
requirement of purpose or knowledge.
Despite the Court's reluctance to constitutionalize the culpability
requirement by making intentional conduct the touchstone of crimi-
nal liability, treating Montana's exclusionary statute as implicitly es-
tablishing a negligence standard for deliberate homicide is both un-
precedented and unprinicipled.80 Such a standard raises other
fairness concerns, apart from due process, which are discussed be-
low. '
As a practical matter, however, the dangerous nature of felonization assures that
the subjective mens rea of recklessness will almost always be present in felony murder
convictions. Doctrinal limits on the felony murder rule also make it less likely that
merely negligent felons will be subject to prosecution for deliberate homicide. See,
e.g., People v. Smith, 678 P.2d 886, 887 (Cal. 1984) (finding that "the acts constituting
[the offense] ... were an integral part of the homicide, [thus] the offense merged
into the homicide [and] it was therefore error to give a felony murder instruction");
People v. Phillips, 414 P.2d 353, 360 (Cal. 1966) (noting that only felonies that are in-
herently dangerous to human life justify the application of the felony murder rule);
State v. Canola, 374 A.2d 20, 30 (NJ. 1977) (prohibiting extension of the felony mur-
der rule "to lethal acts of third persons not in furtherance of the felon[ious]
scheme"). But see Clayton v. State, 272 So. 2d 860, 861 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973)
(holding ingestion of LSD to be an inherently dangerous felony sufficient to support a
felony murder conviction).79 Justice Breyer made a similar argument in his Egelhoffdissent. SeeEgelhoff, 116 S.
Ct. at 2035 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("If the legislature wanted to equate voluntary in-
toxication, knowledge, and purpose, why would it not write a statute that plainly says
so... ?").
Some scholars have argued that the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel
and unusual punishments protects against conviction of murder absent proof of mal-
ice. See Nelson E. Roth & Scott E. Sundby, The Felony-Murder Rule: A Doctrine at Consti-
tutional Crossroads, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 446, 478-85 (1985) (arguing that eliminating
the malice element violates the Eighth Amendment requirement that punishments be
proportional to culpability). This argument is severely undermined by the Court's
narrow reading of the Eighth Amendment's proportionality requirement. See Har-
melin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 959 (1991) ("[T]he Eighth Amendment does not re-
quire strict proportionality between crime and sentence, but rather forbids only ex-
treme sentences that are grossly disproportionate to the crime.").
s, See infra Part III.C.2.e.
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2. The Procedural Question
As noted above, the plurality in Egelhoff would hold that there is
no due process bar to Montana's exclusionary statute properly under-
stood as an evidentiary proscription, rather than a redefinition of the
state's substantive criminal law. Although this argument commanded
only four votes, it has already proven persuasive to lower courts and
state legislatures that have read Egelhoff as validating evidentiary pro-
scriptions that pass the plurality's due process analysis.82 Due to the
broad reading Egelhoffhas been given, and because the main thrust of
the Egelhoff dissents is aimed precisely against this proposition, it is
important to give it serious consideration.
82 See, e.g., Chavez v. Shanks, No. 95-2264, 1997 WL 191498, at *1 (10th Cir. Apr.
18, 1997) ("The Supreme Court last year [in Egelhof/l rejected the argument that [the
right to present intoxication evidence to negate mens real is a fundamental right en-
shrined in the Constitution under the Fourteenth Amendment."); Melendez v. Parke,
No. 95-2332, 1996 WL 459924, at *2 (7th Cir. July 26, 1996) ("The Supreme Court
held [in Egelhoffl that [the Montana statute] does not violate the Due Process Clause,
because it offends neither a fundamental principle of fairness nor the requirement
that the state prove mens rea beyond a reasonable doubt."); Lamarsh v. Roe, No. 96-
4233, 1997 WL 414200, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 14, 1997) (citing Egelhoff for the proposi-
tion that "[t]he exclusion of evidence does not violate the Due Process Clause unless
'it offends some principle ofjustice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our
people as to be ranked as fundamental'"); Gazali v. Cambra, No. 96-3149, 1997 WL
294411, at *8 (N.D. Cal. May 20, 1997) (same); Young v. Kernan, No. 95-4103, 1996
WL 681974, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 1996) (citing Egeihoff for the proposition that
"[t]o demonstrate a violation of the Due Process Clause, the defendant must establish
that his right to have the jury consider the excluded evidence in the case was a
'fundamental principle ofjustice'"); Geiger v. Morton, No. 95-5290, 1996 WL 361474,
at *4 (D.NJ. June 24, 1996) ("In Egelhoff, the Court explained that a defendant's right
to present evidence of voluntary intoxication to negate a requisite mental state is not a
'fundamental' principle ofjustice."); State v. Mott, 931 P.2d 1046, 1052 (Ariz. 1997)
(en banc) ("The [Egelhofj] Court concluded that barring... evidence of voluntary in-
toxication does not violate the constitution."); State v. Fanning, 939 S.W.2d 941, 944-
45 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) ("The [Egelhoff] Court held that it is the respondent who must
show that the principle of procedure violated by the rule (and allegedly required by
due process) is so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be
ranked as fundamental." (quotations omitted)); State v. Pointer, 932 S.W.2d 871, 874
(Mo. Ct App. 1996) ("The United States Supreme Court determined [in Egelhof] that
a defendant's right to have ajury consider evidence of his voluntary intoxication does
not constitute.., a fundamental principle in American jurisprudence."); S.B. 168 &
88, 15th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1997) ("In [Egelhof], the United States Supreme
Court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was not vio-
lated by a Montana law barring ajury in a criminal proceeding from considering evi-
dence of a defendant's voluntary intoxication in determining the existence of a men-
tal state that is an element of a crime."). But see United States v. Scheffer, 44 M.J. 442,
447-48 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (noting that the Egelhoffplurality's reasoning did not command
a majority of the Court); State v. Brown, 931 P.2d 69, 76 (N.M. 1996) (same).
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a. "The Traditions and Conscience of Our People"
The plurality began its analysis of Montana's exclusionary statute
by stating the test that has been used in postincorporation residual
due process jurisprudence: A state's procedural rule violates the Due
Process Clause only if "'it offends some principle ofjustice so rooted
in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental. ' ""s Applying this test, the plurality asserted that Egel-
hoff must have established that "a defendant's right to have a jury
consider evidence of his voluntary intoxication in determining
whether he possesse [d] the requisite mental state is a 'fundamental
principle ofjustice.' 8 4 Noting that historical practice is the "primary
guide" when determining whether a principle is fundamental, 'the
plurality reviewed the common law history of using intoxication evi-
dence to negate mens rea.85 The plurality then concluded that the
common law was in flux at the time the Fourteenth Amendment was
adopted, with the specific intent doctrine just taking root, and that
such equivocal support for intoxication's exculpatory effect was insuf-
ficient to render it a fundamental principle of justice.86 Therefore,
Montana's exclusionary statute did not violate due process.
There is little doubt that the common law treatment of intoxica-
tion evidence was unsettled in the latter half of the nineteenth cen-
tury. Although the specific intent doctrine had a significant toehold
by that time and would eventually gain wide acceptance, as late as
1858 one state court claimed:
To look for deliberation and forethought in a man maddened by intoxi-
cation is vain, for drunkenness has deprived him of the deliberating
faculties to a greater or less extent; and if this deprivation is to relieve
him of all responsibility or to diminish it, the great majority of crimes
committed will go unpunished. This however is not the doctrine of the
common law; and to its maxims, based as they obviously are upon true
wisdom and sound policy, we must adhere.88
83 Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2017 (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 202
(1977)).
8' Id. at 2017.
8' See id. at 2017-20.
"6 See id. at 2021.
87 See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
88 State v. Cross, 27 Mo. 332, 338 (1858).
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The Egelhoff plurality's conclusion on this matter, then, is uncon-
troversial.8' The question remains, though, whether the plurality
conducted the proper inquiry in the first place. Despite the plural-
ity's assertion that Egelhoff's task was to establish as fundamental the
"right to have ajury consider evidence of his voluntary intoxication in
determining whether he possesse [d] the requisite mental state,"90 the
due process test itself does not compel such a narrow formulation of
the right at issue.
b. Which "Principle ofJustice"?: The Inadequacies of the Specificity
Approach to Due Process Analysis
Formulating the putative right to be measured under the due
process test is perhaps the most important and controversial step in
due process analysis-whether an asserted right is protected by the
Due Process Clause is in large part derivative of the linguistic formu-
lation of that right. The level of generality at which an asserted right
is formulated may either bring it within the protection of a recog-
nized due process right, or exclude it from protection under the Due
Process Clause.91 If the fundamental right at issue in Egelhoff had
been characterized more generally as the defendant's "right to a fair
opportunity to put forward his defense, in adversarial testing where
the State must prove the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable
doubt, 9 2 the outcome of the due process inquiry may have been dif-
ferent. At the very least, the due process inquiry would not have
ceased upon finding that intoxication evidence was not universally
admissible to negate mens rea at common law. Instead, an analysis of
the recognized due process right to present a defense would have
been dispositive.
The levels of generality problem is one that has divided the Court
and the academy along readily discernible ideological lines. The ap-
proach taken depends, in part, on one's view of the role of the judge
All of the dissenters agreed that the common law was unsettled on this point.
SeeEgelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2031 (O'Connor, J, dissenting) ("At the time the Fourteenth
Amendment was ratified, the common-law rule on consideration of intoxication evi-
dence was in flux.").
90 Id. at 2017.
91 This is referred to as the "levels of generality problem," and has received signifi-
cant attention from the academic bar. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf,
Levels of Generality in the Definition of Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 1057 (1990) (discussing
this problem extensively).
Egeihoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2031 (O'Connor,J., dissenting).
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in constitutional interpretation and of the nature of the Constitution
itself. Is the Constitution a "living document," which judges are
charged with interpreting in the face of ever-evolving ideals of fair-
ness andjustice? Or is the Constitution a document that is necessarily
limited in scope, which judges must interpret by considering only its
text? 93 Happily, these larger questions are beyond the scope of this
Comment. However, the levels of generality problem is of central
importance to evaluating the plurality's analysis, and, therefore, de-
serves attention here.
Justice Scalia, who authored the plurality opinion in Egelhoff has
made his solution to the levels of generality problem clear elsewhere.
In Michael H. v. Gerald D.,94 he argued that, in characterizing the right
at issue in due process analyses, the Court must "refer to the most
specific level at which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying pro-
tection to, the asserted right can be identified.""' A more general in-
quiry would, according to Justice Scalia, "permit judges to dictate
rather than discern.., society's views."9 In Michael H., thb right so
characterized was the right of the natural father of an illegitimate
child to claim parental rights against the mother's husband.97 In Egel-
hoff the right so characterized was the right to negate mens rea with
intoxication evidence, because tradition (that is, the common law)
9' Of course, this characterization of the opposing positions is overly simplistic.
Few would argue that judges have unfettered reign over constitutional interpretation.
Likewise, as Professors Tribe and Dorf note, "adherents of a philosophy ofjudicial re-
straint generally admit that in spelling out the meaning of vague constitutional
phrases justices must indeed look beyond the Constitution," usually to the intent of
the drafters, whether determined by direct evidence or by inference from historical
tradition. Tribe & Dorf, supra note 91, at 1062-63.
The characterization of the recognized due process right is also subject to the lev-
els of generality problem. "The more abstractly one states the already-protected right,
the more likely it becomes that the claimed right will fall within its protection." Id. at
1058. This aspect of the levels of generality problem is most conspicuously at issue in
the unenumerated rights debate, where the central issue is how broadly to read consti-
tutional provisions. Compare Ronald Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights: Whether and How
Roe Should Be Overruled, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 381, 381 (1992) (arguing that"the distinc-
tion between enumerated and unenumerated rights [should be] safely shut up with
other legal concepts dishonorably discharged for bad philosophy"), with Richard A.
Posner, Legal Reasoning from the Top Down and from the Bottom Up: The Question of Un-
enumerated Constitutional Rights, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 433, 437 (1992) (arguing that failing
to distinguish unenumerated rights from enumerated rights is a hallmark of constitu-
tional theorizing that "goes beyond and eventually submerges textual distinctions").
491 U.S. 110 (1989).





speaks to this specific right. Similarly, Justice Scalia's specificity ap-
proach dictates that the right at issue in Bowers v. Hardwick93 was the
"right to engage in homosexual sodomy,"99 because the common laws,
statutory law, and "Judeao-Christian moral and ethical standards" t
prohibited such conduct.
By its own terms, the polestar of the specificity approach is
"tradition'"-in particular, the traditional notions of justice that pre-
dominated in 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified.
Reading the Due Process Clause as codifying nineteenth-century tra-
ditions of procedural and substantive justice has been sharply criti-
cized by other members of the Court. For example, in response to
Justice Scalia's argument in Michael H., Justice Brennan, joined by
Justices Marshall and Blackmun, maintained:
Apparently oblivious to the fact that [the concept of "tradition"] can be
as malleable and as elusive as "liberty" itself, the plurality pretends that
tradition places a discernible border around the Constitution. The pre-
tense is seductive; it would be comforting to believe that a search for
"tradition" involves nothing more idiosyncratic or complicated than por-
ing through dusty volumes on American history.
Just as common-law notions no longer define the "property" that
the Constitution protects, neither do they circumscribe the "liberty" that
it guarantees. 01
For Justice Brennan, this point goes to the very essence of the na-
ture of the Constitution and the interpretive role of the judge:
The document that the plurality construes today is unfamiliar to me.
It is not the living charter that I have taken to be our Constitution; it is
instead a stagnant, archaic, hidebound document steeped in the preju-
dices and superstitions of a time long past. This Constitution does not
recognize that times change, does not see that sometimes a practice or
rule outlives its foundations. I cannot accept an interpretive method
that does such violence to the charter that I am bound by oath to up-
hold. 2
0s 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
99 Id. at 191.
Id. at 196 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (citations omitted).
491 U.S. at 137-38 (Brennan,J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
102 Id. at 141 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Professor Dworkin has voiced similarly vis-
ceral objections to the role of tradition as dispositive of constitutional questions. See
Dworkin, supra note 93, at 384 (criticizing originalism as portraying the Constitution
"not as defining the skeleton of an overall conception ofjustice, but as only an antique
list of the particular demands that a relatively few people long ago happened to think
important. [Such an approach] hopes to turn the Bill of Rights from a constitutional
1997]
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Because I do not wish to belabor these and other theory-based
criticisms of the specificity approach,' I will simply offer two further
objections that are usually overlooked in the race toward constitu-
tional theorizing: Justice Scalia's specificity approach has been ex-
pressly rejected by a majority of the current Court, and its operation
leads to clearly wrong results.
The specificity approach not only was eschewed by a majority of
the Court at its inception, but also fails to account for the Court's
many due process cases that decidedly have not been based on a his-
torical analysis of the most specifically identifiable formulation of the
asserted right. Although, as noted above, Justice Scalia's specificity
approach was employed sub silentio by the Court in Bowers (a pre-
Michael H. case), the dissent in that case pointedly questioned its use:
This case is no more about "a fundamental right to engage in homo-
sexual sodomy," as the Court purports to declare, than Stanley v. Georgia
was about a fundamental right to watch obscene movies, or Katz v.
United States was about a fundamental right to place interstate bets from
a telephone booth.1
4
Opposition to Justice Scalia's specificity approach crystallized into
a majority position in Planned Parenthood v. Casey: "It is... tempting
... to suppose that the Due Process Clause protects only those prac-
tices, defined at the most specific level, that were protected against
government interference by other rules of law when the Fourteenth
Amendment was ratified. But such a view would be inconsistent with
our law."0 5
There is a second basic problem with the specificity approach: It
leads to results that are clearly wrong. If, as the specificity approach
mandates, contrary common law treatment regarding a specific chal-
lenged practice always trumped the assertion of a right putatively
guaranteed by the Due Process Clause, some of the Court's most
clearly correct decisions would fall. For instance, despite the fact that
most states barred interracial marriage in 1868, few would dispute the
charter into a document with the texture and tone of an insurance policy or a stan-
dard form commercial lease.").
'03 Other theory-based objections are voiced in Tribe & Dorf, supra note 91, at
1072-85 (comparing analogies of law to literature versus mathematics).
'0 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted) (citing Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), and Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347 (1967)).
10' 505 U.S. 833, 847 (1992) (citation omitted).
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correctness of the Court's decision in Loving v. Virginia,'°' which
struck down such antimiscegenation laws as violative of due process.
Brown v. Board of Education, too, would be jeopardized; segregated
public education was well-rooted in the "history and traditions of our
people" when it was found to violate due process in 1954. '
Likewise, the specificity approach arguably lets stand some of the
Court's most clearly wrong decisions. A particularly tragic example is
Buck v. Bell, in which the Court rejected a due process challenge to a
Virginia statute mandating the compulsory sterilization of institution-
alized persons with the infamous remark that "[t]hree generations of
imbeciles are enough."'0 8 As a result of that decision, Carrie Buck was
forcibly sterilized, only to be found years later to be a woman of nor-
mal intelligence who was institutionalized by her foster parents to
cover up an incestuous rape that resulted in her pregnancy.' °9 Would
Justice Scalia reaffirm Buck? Under the specificity approach, a due
process challenge to compulsory sterilization would require a claim-
ant to show a deeply rooted tradition of being free from such proce-
dures. In fact, involuntary sterilization enjoys a nearly one-hundred-
year heritage in our society."0
Nor can all such cases easily be dismissed as equal protection,
rather than due process, cases. Buck, for example, raised no equal
protection problem injustice Holmes's mind."' Even under modem
equal protection jurisprudence, there seems to be no equal protec-
tion problem: Heightened scrutiny"2 seems inappropriate since
'6 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
107 See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954);see also Rutan v. Republi-
can Party, 497 U.S. 62, 82 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("'[I]f the age of a perni-
cious practice were a sufficient reason for its continued acceptance, the constitutional
attack on racial discrimination would, of course, have been doomed to failure.'"
(citation omitted) (footnote omitted) (quoting Illinois State Employees Union v.
Lewis, 473 F.2d 561, 568 n.14 (7th Cir. 1972) (citation omitted))).
i's 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (Holmes,J.).
,o9 See Stephen Jay Gould, Carrie Buck's Daughter, 2 CONST. COMMENTARY 331, 336
(1985).
"o SeeElizabethJ. Reed, Note, Ciminal Law and the Capacity of Mentally Retarded Per-
sons to Consent to Sexual Activity, 83 VA. L. REV. 799, 803-05 (1997) (discussing the his-
tory of involuntary sterilization in the United States); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16,
§ 5704 (1995) (permitting involuntary sterilization).
"' See Buck, 274 U.S. at 208 (referring to equal protection claims as "the usual last
resort of constitutional arguments").
"1 See generally Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) ("At the very least, the
Equal Protection Clause demands that racial classifications ... be subjected to the
'most rigid scrutiny,' and, if they are ever to be upheld, they must be shown to be nec-
essary to the accomplishment of some permissible state objective, independent of the
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"imbeciles" are not a suspect or quasi-suspect class, Carrie Buck was
white, Virginia sterilized both sexes, and a rational basis"3 for the law
was, and still is, thought to be apparent. A theory of due process
that permits the state forcibly to sterilize its citizens upon an asserted
interest in preventing "socially inadequate offspring" is troublesome
indeed.11
When pushed, Justice Scalia rebuts the argument that the speci-
ficity approach to due process analysis validates too much by arguing
that the tradition supporting a challenged practice must be one of
"unchallenged validity," and that such a tradition can trump only
"ambiguous constitutional text.' 1n 6 Thus, according to Justice Scalia,
Brown was correctly decided because: (1) "in the 19th century the
principle of 'separate-but-equal' had been vigorously opposed on
constitutional grounds, litigated up to this Court, and upheld only
over the dissent of [Justice Harlan,] one of our historically most re-
spected Justices";" 7 and (2) the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amend-
racial discrimination which it was the object of the Fourteenth Amendment to elimi-
nate." (quoting Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944))).
11 See generally Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949)
(explaining that so long as the classification at issue is not a suspect or quasi-suspect
class, it must bear only a "relation to the purpose for which it is made" in order to
withstand scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause).
114 See Buck, 274 U.S. at 207 ("It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to
execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, soci-
ety can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind."). The pol-
icy justifications have not run dry in the past seventy years. See, e.g., Beverly Hors-
burgh, Schr6dinger's Cat, Eugenics, and the Compulsoy Sterilization of Welfare Mothers, 17
CARD OzO L. REv. 531, 535 (1996) (noting one study's finding that "ninety-seven per-
cent of obstetricians favor the sterilization of unmarried welfare mothers").
The equal protection argument I sketch in the text is drawn from DANIEL A.
FARBER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 404-06 (1993)
(discussing the likely result in Buck under modern equal protection jurisprudence).
Since Buck, the Court has invalidated one state compulsory-sterilization statute on
statute-specific equal protection grounds. See Skinner v. Oklahoma ex reL Williamson,
316 U.S. 535 (1942). The Skinner Court did not overrule Buck, however. See id. at 542
(distinguishing Buck).
11 The right to procreate arguably was established as fundamental in Skinner. See
Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541 ("Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very exis-
tence and survival of the race."); see also Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258,
2267 (1997) (citing Skinner as establishing the right to procreate as fundamental); Re-
cent Legislation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 799 (1997) (discussing constitutional issues sur-
rounding compulsory sterilization). However, this does not change the fact that the
specificity approach approves of involuntary sterilization after no more analysis than a
bit of historical research.
116 Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62, 95-96 n.1 (1990) (ScaliaJ., dissenting).




ments "leave[] no room for doubt that laws treating people differ-
ently because of their race are invalid."".
The problem with Justice Scalia's qualifications, however, is that
they reintroduce the inevitable subjectivity that the specificity ap-
proach purports to banish from constitutional decisionmaking. As-
serting the putative validity of a counter-traditional outcome by de-
claring certain clauses of the Constitution "unambiguous" merely
begs the question of constitutionality. It also seems counterintuitive
to allow the due process inquiry to turn on whether a practice has
been unsuccessfully challenged in the past. Under this aspect of the
specificity approach, perhaps the next three or four Egelhoff like chal-
lenges will successfully chip away at the tradition of excluding intoxi-
cation evidence so as to allow the fifth to succeed."9
Moreover, Justice Scalia does not faithfully apply these qualifica-
tions of his specificity approach. In Egeihoff, for example, Justice
Scalia proceeded under the specificity approach, despite both the
ambiguity of the Due Process Clause on the issue of excluding intoxi-
cation evidence offered to negate mens rea, and the fact that the
common law tradition of prohibiting intoxication evidence to negate
mens rea was clearly "challenged" by both common law scholars and
common law courts.
2 0
c. The Specificity Approach and Evidentiary Proscriptions
The specificity approach and reliance on tradition has been es-
chewed in other cases involving procedural due process challenges to
evidentiary proscriptions. In Crane v. Kentucky, the Court held that
excluding evidence challenging the credibility of the defendant's
confession violated the defendant's "fundamental [due process] right
to a fair opportunity to present a defense." 2 ' The state court in Crane
held that the excluded evidence bore only on the voluntariness of the
confession, a legal issue already determined by the court, and not on
"8 Id. at 95 (Scalia,J., dissenting).
119 The requirement that a tradition be one of"unchallenged acceptance" in order
to be insulated from a due process challenge seems to be rooted in the defense of tra-
dition's role in constitutional decisionmaking offered by Justice Kennedy: "Historical
acceptince of legal institutions seres to validate them not because history provides
the most convenient rule of decision but because we have confidence that a long-
accepted legal institution would not have survived if it rested upon procedures found
to be either irrational or unfair." Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 40
(1991) (KennedyJ, concurring in thejudgment).
1 See supra Part II.A.
12' 476 U.S. 683, 687 (1986).
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the confession's credibility.12 A unanimous Supreme Court did not
inquire into the common law treatment of confession evidence, nor
did it rely on nineteenth-century state evidentiary practices. Instead,
the Court emphasized: (1) "the common-sense understanding that
the circumstances surrounding the taking of a confession can be
highly relevant to the two separate inquiries" of voluntariness and
credibility;2 and (2) the unfairness to the defendant that would re-
sult from excluding the evidence.
4
The Court has taken a similar approach in its Sixth Amendment
decisions involving evidentiary proscriptions. For example, in Taylor
v. Illinois,12' the Court held that the Compulsory Process Clause of the
Sixth Amendment, made applicable to the states through the Four-
teenth Amendment,126 confers upon a criminal defendant a funda-
mental right to present witnesses in his defense.1 2 7 At issue in Taylor
was the constitutionality of a discovery sanction that excluded the trial
testimony of an undisclosed defense witness. 28  To determine the
breadth of the defendant's right (and, thus, the extent to which it
could be curtailed consistent with due process), the Court did not in-
quire into how, if at all, the common law treated eleventh-hour testi-
mony. Rather, the Court weighed the prudential concerns of smooth
and orderly trial procedures, fairness to both parties in the adversary
system, and the public interest in the full disclosure of crucial facts to
conclude that the Compulsory Process Clause does not create an ab-
solute bar to such an evidentiary proscription.'
122 See id. at 686-87 (setting forth the state court's assertion that there was no error
in excluding testimony about the circumstances of the confession "[b]ecause
the ... testimony... pertained only to the voluntariness question").
1 Id. at 688-89.
12, See id. at 690 (concluding "that the blanket exclusion of proffered testimony
about the circumstances of [defendant's] confession deprived him of a fair trial").
12 484 U.S. 400 (1988).
'2' See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18 (1967) ("The right of an accused to
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor stands on no lesser foot-
ing than the other Sixth Amendment rights that we have previously held applicable to
the States.").
217 See Taylor, 484 U.S. at 408-09 (noting that "[flew rights are more fundamental
than that of an accused to present witnesses in his own defense").
12 See id. at 401-02 ("The question presented is whether that refusal [to allow the
undisclosed witness to testify] violated the petitioner's constitutional right to obtain
the testimony of favorable witnesses.").
12 See id. at 411-12 ("The trial process would be a shambles if either party had an
absolute right to control the time and content of his witnesses' testimony.").
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d. An Alternative Approach: The Right to Present Competent, Reliable
Evidence in Defense to a Criminal Charge
I have argued above that the plurality's historical survey in Egelhoff
should not be the final word on whether Montana's exclusionary stat-
ute violates due process. An alternative approach, urged by the Egel-
hoff dissenters, is based on a line of cases establishing a defendant's
due process right to present a defense. In Chambers v. Mississippi, the
Court articulated that right: "The right of an accused in a criminal
trial to due process is, in essence, the right to a fair opportunity to de-
fend against the State's accusations." "0 A "fair opportunity," of
course, does not mean an unlimited opportunity. The Chambers
Court made clear that criminal defendants "must comply with estab-
lished rules of procedure and evidence designed to assure both fair-
ness and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt and innocence. 1 3'
Due to the prejudicial nature of evidentiary proscriptions, however,
the asserted interests of the state in utilizing such rules and proce-
dures must be "closely examined."
3
1
In Crane v. Kentucky, the Court clarified the notion of "fair oppor-
tunity."13  As discussed above, Crane involved the exclusion of evi-
dence relating to the circumstances of a murder defendant's confes-
sion. The Court reiterated the State's legitimate and overriding
interest in "exclud[ing] evidence through the application of eviden-
tiary rules that... serve the interests of fairness and reliability,"'3 4 but
concluded that the "blanket exclusion" at issue in Crane did not serve
these interests.13 1 In essence, the Crane Court held that evidentiary
proscriptions that do not serve valid state interests deprive a criminal
defendant of a fair trial, and, therefore, violate the Due Process
Clause. According to the Court, the fair opportunity to defend
against the State's accusations
would be an empty one if the State were permitted to exclude compe-
tent, reliable evidence ... when such evidence is central to the defen-
dant's claim of innocence. In the absence of any valid state justification,
exclusion of this kind of exculpatory evidence deprives a defendant of
"' 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973).
"' Id. at 302.
"2 Id. at 295.
"3 476 U.S. 683 (1986).
's Id. at 690.
" Id. at 690-91.
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the basic right to have the prosecutor's case encounter and "survive the




The plurality in Egelhoff emphasized the error of the Supreme
Court of Montana's overstatement that criminal defendants have a
"'due process right to present and have considered by the jury all
relevant evidence to rebut the State's evidence on all elements of the
offense charged." 37 The plurality correctly noted that exclusion is
proper if the evidence is incompetent, privileged, or unreliable, or if
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice.' s' These bases for exclusion, however, are derivative of the
state's valid interest in assuring fairness and reliability in the criminal
process.'9 The central question in Egelhoffshould have been whether
Montana's exclusionary statute is based on these interests. If it is,
then it conforms to due process requirements. If, however, the stat-
ute is based on other interests, then Montana has overstepped the
bounds of permissible justification for limiting a defendant's presen-
tation of exculpatory evidence.
The plurality maintained that a state's pursuit of "legitimate pe-
nological goals" may justify evidentiary proscriptions. 140 The plurality
marshaled a myriad of policy goals that purportedly are served by
rendering intoxication irrelevant to criminal liability: deterrence of
irresponsible drunken behavior, incapacitation, and the reaffirmation
of "society's moral perception that one who has voluntarily impaired
his own faculties should be responsible for the consequences."1 4' Ad-
ditionally, the plurality noted one other justification that "makes
some sense": intoxication evidence may be misleading because juries
may operate under a cultural misperception that intoxication neces-
"6 Id. (quoting U.S. v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656 (1984)).
Egelhoff 116 S. Ct. at 2016, 2017 (quoting State v. Egelhoff, 900 P.2d at 266).
1 See id. at 2017.
Justice O'Connor noted:
To be sure, the right to present evidence is not limitless; for example, it does
not permit the defendant to introduce any and all evidence he believes
might work in his favor, nor does it generally invalidate the operation of tes-
timonial privileges. Nevertheless, "an essential component of procedural
fairness is an opportunity to be heard. That opportunity would be an empty
one if the State were permitted to exclude competent, reliable evidence" that
is essential to the accused's defense.
Id. at 2027 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (quoting Crane 476 U.S. at
690).
140 Id. at 2021 n.5.
' Id. at 2020.
[Vol. 146: 269
INTOXICATED WRONGDOERS
sarily causes people to be violent.1 ' According to the plurality, this
misperception, coupled with evidence of intoxication, may render ju-
ries "too quick to accept the claim that the defendant was biologically
incapable of forming the requisite mens rea.
"
1
As Chambers and Crane make clear, there is a significant difference
between a policy goal that might inform a state's substantive criminal
law and an interest in fairness and reliability that might support an
evidentiary proscription. Undoubtedly, the policy goals discussed by
the plurality are laudable and are properly the concern of the state.
The question is whether the state may assert these goals by restricting
a defendant's right to present a defense rather than by modifying its
substantive law. Chambers and Crane certainly imply that a state must
effectuate such criminalization judgments through its substantive
criminal law.
Why should this be the case? If the end (here, holding intoxi-
cated wrongdoers criminally liable to the same extent as sober of-
fenders) is permissible, why are the means to that end important?
What harm is done when the state effectuates its policy choices by
limiting the rights of criminal defendants? First and foremost, as dis-
cussed above, the Court has sanctioned a state's exclusion of exculpa-
tory evidence only where the state seeks to advance the interests of
fairness and reliability in the criminal process.! Extending this ra-
tionale to cover the effectuation of criminalization judgments is not
supported by the Court's precedents. It is also fundamentally unfair.
This unfairness is demonstrated by exanfining Montana's proffered
justification for its exclusionary statute:
Montana is unwilling to allow those who commit serious crimes to bene-
fit from a voluntarily assumed condition.... In addition, the societal
consequences from intoxication are so detrimental that, as to the exis-
tence of a required mental state, the intoxicated person should be de-
nied any exculpatory excuse based on the mere fact of voluntary intoxi-
cation.... Allowing a defendant to exculpate his conduct by means of a
self-induced condition flies in the face of the principle of personal ac-
countability forming the foundation of all law.... [Montana's exclu-
sionary statute] ... depriv[es] a voluntarily intoxicated person of the
ability to negative the intent element of a crime on the basis of his in-
142 See id. at 2021.
4 Id.
14 See, e.g., Crane, 476 U.S. at 690 ("[W]e have never questioned the power of
States to exclude evidence through the application of evidentiary rules that themselves
serve the interests of fairness and reliability-even if the defendant would prefer to see
that evidence admitted.").
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toxication-i.e., by depriving him of the ability to use one form of cul-
pable conduct to eliminate responsibility for another.1
Nowhere does Montana suggest that intoxication evidence is mis-
leading, unreliable, or otherwise unfair when it is offered to negate
mens rea. In fact, Montana readily acknowledges the probative value
and reliability of intoxication evidence when offered to negate mens
rea: its exclusionary statute allows introduction of such evidence to
negate mens rea in cases of involuntary intoxication. This double
standard demonstrates the unfairness of Montana's exclusionary stat-
ute. Montana's actual state interest, therefore, is "to ensure that even
a defendant who lacked the required mental-state element-and is
therefore not guilty-is nevertheless convicted of the offense."1 47 Put
differently, Montana's interest is to convict Egelhoff of negligent de-
148liberate homicide. Such an interest is illegitimate.
The policy goals that Montana articulates, 149 and that the Egelhoff
plurality reiterated, °5 0 are perfectly legitimate goals that might inform
a criminalization judgment, but they are not goals that validly may be
asserted against a defendant's right to introduce exculpatory evidence
to defend against a charge that requires, in part, the existence of a
particular mental state.
The only argument for the exclusion of intoxication evidence on
reliability grounds is the plurality's argument that such evidence may
mislead and confuse juries. This putative justification is based on
psychological studies that suggest that the connection between in-
toxication and criminal conduct is as much cultural as pharmacologi-
cal.' 52 The argument is that people have learned beliefs that intoxica-
tion causes criminal conduct, and that these beliefs lead intoxicated
Brief for Petitioner [State of Montana] at 18-19, Egelhoff, (No. 95-566).
16 SeeMONT. CODEANN. § 45-2-203 (1997).
47 Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2028 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
18 See supra Part III.C.l.b.
"9 See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
,5 SeeEgelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2020-21.
"I See supra notes 142-43 and accompanying text.
,12 See James J. Collins, Suggested Explanatory Frameworks to Clarify the Alcohol
Use/Violence Relationship, 15 CONTEMp. DRUG PROBS. 107, 109 (1988) (noting "the rele-
vance of psychological, social and cultural factors" in addition to the physiological fac-
tor); Barbara Critchlow, The Powers ofJohn Barleycorn: Beliefs About the Effects ofAlcohol on
Social Behavior, 41 AM. PSYcHOLOGIST 751, 751 (1986) (refusing to ignore the pharma-




people to commit crimes5 3 and lead juries to conclude that intoxi-
cated wrongdoers are incapable of forming the mens rea of the of-
fense charged."" Assuming the latter conclusion is incorrect, intoxi-
cation evidence should be kept from juries because it is misleading.
Given the equivocal support this argument receives from the plu-
rality,5 s and Justice Scalia's elsewhere-proclaimed skepticism toward
basing law on psychology,156 it is questionable whether the plurality
gives much credence to this argument. This argument, however, is
the only justification based on the legitimate state interest of assuring
the fairness and reliability of criminal proceedings. Regardless of the
validity of the argument, Montana clearly did not offer it as ajustifica-
tion for its exclusionary statute.5 "
e. Cutting Conceptual Corners and Subjective Perceptions of Unfairness
Independent of the due process argument made above, there are
two other reasons to question the legitimacy of implementing crimi-
nalization judgments through evidentiary proscriptions that curb a
defendant's right to present reliable exculpatory evidence.
First, inferring modifications of the substantive criminal law from
rules about the admissibility of evidence obscures the underlying
criminalization judgment, thereby insulating it from political debate.
Reading Montana's exclusionary statute as a redefinition of the
State's substantive criminal law amounts, as I argue above, to the pun-
ishment of some negligent homicides as deliberate homicides.'5s To
infer such a significant change in the substantive criminal law from an
evidentiary proscription seems odd, especially considering the legisla-
ture's retention of the subjective mens rea element of deliberate
homicide. 5' Montana's brief to the Supreme Court in Egelhoff relied
"' See Collins, supra note 152, at 115; Critchlow, supra note 152, at 754-55.
"s SeeEgelhoff 116 S. Ct. at 2021.
... See id. (characterizing the misleading-evidence rationale as making "some
sense").
's SeeLee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 636 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[I]nterior
decorating is a rock-hard science compared to psychology practiced by [udges]. A few
citations of '[r]esearch in psychology' that have no particular bearing upon the pre-
cise issue here cannot disguise the fact that the Court has gone beyond the realm
wherejudges know what they are doing." (alteration in original) (citation omitted)).
117 SeeEgelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2028-29 (O'ConnorJ, dissenting).
i. See supra Part III.C.l.b.
" SeeEgelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2035 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("If the legislature wanted
to equate voluntary intoxication, knowledge, and purpose, why would it not write a
statute that plainly says so... ?").
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on the language of the exclusionary statute 60 to argue that the Mon-
tana legislature intended to redefine the substantive criminal law:
"The first clause represents a general statement of legislative intent to
remove intoxication as a ground for negativing a defendant's criminal
responsibility." 6' This claim is dubious, though, given that the legis-
lature plainly thought that intoxication evidence itself was sufficiently
probative of mental state to exculpate a defendant who was involun-
tarily intoxicated.'62
Rather than evidencing a legislative intent to redefine the sub-
stantive criminal law, Montana's exclusionary statute appears to be a
vague affirmation of the social judgment that intoxicated wrongdoers
should be kept from asserting admittedly exculpatory evidence (i.e.,
voluntary intoxication) because that evidence itself indicates a
blameworthy character. The crucial point here is that this social
judgment bears only on the use of intoxication as an affirmative defense, not
as a failure of proof claim. A legislature cannot make a social judgment
as to what facts are pharmacologically relevant to the formation of a
requisite mental state. Properly understood, Montana's exclusionary
statute is intended only to prevent intoxicated wrongdoers from be-
ing ipso facto excused from criminal liability. This is very different
from asserting that intoxication is irrelevant to the question of mens
rea.
The Court's willingness to infer a redefinition of a state's substan-
tive law relieves the legislature of its obligation to consider these is-
sues. After Egelhoff, the legislature need not consider the constitu-
tional differences between banning an affirmative defense and
limiting a failure of proof claim. The legislature need not sort out
exactly what it thinks is wrong about an intoxicated wrongdoer being
acquitted of a crime; the fiction of an "implicit redefinition" replaces
candid consideration of criminalization judgments. The result is to
diminish the likelihood of full and open legislative debate on the na-
ture of criminalization judgments and the due process concerns they
implicate.
The second reason to question the legitimacy of implementing
criminalization judgments through evidentiary proscriptions is that
couching modifications of the substantive criminal law in rules about
" "A person who is in an intoxicated condition is criminally responsible for his
conduct...." MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-203 (1997).
16' Reply Brief for Petitioner [State of Montana] at 16 (No. 95-566).




the admissibility of evidence entails a significant danger of increasing
subjective perceptions of unfairness among criminal defendants. A
defendant is likely to perceive unfairness if his jury is instructed that,
on the one hand, the State must prove purpose or knowledge beyond
a reasonable doubt, but on the other hand, the jury must not con-
sider his intoxication as challenging the State's proof. If the crimi-
nalization judgment were effected through a redefinition of the sub-
stantive criminal law rather than through an evidentiary proscription,
the State, presumably, would be required to produce no evidence of
the subjective mental state of an intoxicated wrongdoer at trial.163 Al-
though a rule of this type sounds rather harsh, for the intoxicated
wrongdoer who otherwise would be exculpated by intoxication evi-
dence, it is no harsher, and is much more forthright, than simply pre-
venting him from presenting his only relevant rebuttal evidence.
Aside from general fairness considerations, why might one care
about a criminal defendant's perception of unfairness? One reason
might be the prevention of recidivism. A defendant who feels he has
been treated unfairly by the criminal justice system may be more
likely to commit crimes in the future. This is the conclusion of
"defiance theory." 64 According to defiance theorists, the convict who
sincerely feels he has been unfairly treated is not shamed by the im-
position of a criminal sanction; rather, he feels stigmatized by it.'
6
5
This reaction eviscerates the deterrent effect of punishment, and may
in fact lead to increased recidivism.' 66
A second reason to limit a criminal defendant's perception of un-
fairness is to prevent wasteful appeals. Here, the presumption is that
many criminal appeals are motivated by perceived procedural unfair-
ness rather than by protestations of innocence. Although this is an
16 This would depend, of course, on the exact nature of the substantive statute.
16 See, e.g., Lawrence W. Sherman, Defiance, Deterrence, and Irrelevance 30 J. REs.
CRIME & DELINQ. 445, 459-61 (1993) (summarizing defiance theory).
1 See id. The stigmatizing effect of perceived unfairness has led some commenta-
tors to use defiance theory to explain racial disparities in the criminal justice system.
See, e.g., Katheryn K. Russell, The Racial Hoax as Crime: The Law as Affirmation, 71 IND.
L.J. 593, 607-11 (1996) (discussing defiance theory to explain the nexus between race
and crime).
"6 See JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION 177-82 (1989)
(arguing that successfully shaming an offender is integral to the moral education and
deterrent qualities of criminal punishment); Sherman, supra note 164, at 461 (noting
that "the unfair stigmatizing sanction will increase.., future rates of offending"). See
generally TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990) (drawing a causal connec-
tion between perceptions of fairness, judgments of legitimacy, and future patterns of
compliance with the law).
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empirical premise that would be difficult to verify, it seems safe to as-
sume that limiting perceptions of unfairness would at least marginally
affect the rate of wasteful appeals. This may be especially true in cases
like Egelhoff where the perceived unfairness is the arbitrary limitation
of one's defense.1
67
Another reason to care about perceptions of unfairness is that the
Supreme Court has recognized limiting such perceptions as impor-
tant. In the context of issues ranging from race-based peremptory
challenges,) to the right to private counsel, to the right to a hear-ing before being branded a Communist,'" the Supreme Court has
Jr7 See, e.g., Thomas Gilson, Federal Sentencing Guidelines-The Requirement of Notice for
Upward Departure, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1029, 1051-52 (1992) (arguing that
conditioning an upward departure from the sentencing guidelines on whether the
defendant testifies at trial is likely to result in an appeal based on the perceived un-
fairness of limiting the presentation of a defense).
... As noted by Justice Kennedy:
The jury acts as a vital check against the wrongful exercise of power by the
State and its prosecutors. The intrusion of racial discrimination into the jury
selection process damages both the fact and the perception of this guaran-
tee.... Active discrimination by a prosecutor during this process ... invites
cynicism respecting the jury's neutrality and its obligation to adhere to the
law.
The purpose of the jury system is to impress upon the criminal defendant
and the community as a whole that a verdict of conviction or acquittal is given
in accordance with the law by persons who are fair. The verdict will not be
accepted or understood in these terms if the jury is chosen by unlawful means
at the outset.
Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 411-13 (1991) (citations omitted).
"9 In dissent, justice Blackmun wrote:
Not only are decisions crucial to the defendant's liberty placed in counsel's
hands, but the defendant's perception of the fairness of the process, and his
willingness to acquiesce in its results, depend upon his confidence in his
counsel's dedication, loyalty, and ability. When the Government insists upon
the right to choose the defendant's counsel for him, that relationship of trust
is undermined: counsel is too readily perceived as the Government's agent
rather than his own.
Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 645 (1989) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (citations omitted); see also Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975)
(discussing the right of a criminal defendant to represent himself, and noting that
"[t]o force a lawyer on a defendant can only lead him to believe that the law contrives
against him").
Justice Frankfurter found that:
The validity and moral authority of a conclusion largely depend on the mode
by which it was reached.... No better instrument has been devised for arriv-
ing at truth than to give a person in jeopardy of serious loss notice of the case
against him and opportunity to meet it. Nor has a better way been found for




recognized that perceptions of unfairness undermine the legitimacy
of the criminal justice system. In fact, a criminal defendant's percep-
tion of unfairness has been considered an injury in fact sufficient to
confer Article III standing.
17 1
IV. EGELtoFFAND OTHER STATES' EXCLUSIONARY SCHEMES
As noted above, eleven states (in addition to Montana) currently
prohibit the use of intoxication evidence to negate mens rea.'7
These evidentiary proscriptions have been made law in three ways: by
specific statutory provision; by judicial interpretation of a general
statutory provision; and by judicial decision. Because Egelhoff s hold-
ing relied on Justice Ginsburg's determination that Montana's exclu-
sionary statute redefined the state's substantive criminal laiv,s the
constitutionality of other states' exclusionary schemes remains an
open question. This Part briefly discusses some of these other exclu-
sionary schemes in light of Egelhoff and the foregoing critique of the
reasoning in that case. I do not intend to explore fully the constitu-
tionality of these schemes. Rather, this Part clarifies the limits of the
Court's holding in Egelhoff and suggests that the concerns raised by
Egelhoff are implicated to an even greater extent by some other states'
exclusionary schemes. This analysis is particularly relevant as state
legislatures and lower courts, both federal and state, continue to rely
on Egeihoff to enact and review similar exclusionary schemes.'74
A. Proscription by Speciflc Statutory Provision
Arizona, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Missouri, and Pennsylvania pro-
hibit by specific statutory provision the use of voluntary intoxication
evidence to negate mens rea. 175 Each of these exclusionary' schemes,
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171-72 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
171 See Powers, 499 U.S. at 411 ("The discriminatory use of peremptory challenges by
the prosecution causes a defendant cognizable injury... because racial discrimination
in the selection of jurors 'casts doubt on the integrity of the judicial process' and
places the fairness of a criminal proceeding in doubt." (quoting Rose v. Mitchell, 443
U.S. 545,556 (1979))).
172 See supra text accompanying notes 29-30.
1 See supra text accompanying notes 57-58.
174 See supra notes 30, 82.
1 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-503 (Supp. 1997) ("[Voluntary intoxication] is not a
defense for any criminal act or requisite state of mind."); HAW. REV. STAT. § 702-
230(2) (1993) ("Evidence of self-induced intoxication of the defendant is not admissi-
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with the probable exception of Hawaii's, is similar enough to the
Montana statute upheld in Egelhoffto be deemed constitutional under
that decision. 176 Although Egelhoff maintains that an exclusionary
statute "regulating solely the admissibility of evidence at trial" is un-
constitutional,17 Justice Ginsburg's expansive reading of the Montana
statute in Egelhoffas accomplishing an implicit redefinition of the sub-
stantive offense' 7" assures that the statutes in these states fall safely
within Egelhoff s holding.
Hawaii's exclusionary statute is unique. Section 702-230(2) of the
Hawaii Revised Statutes provides:
Evidence of self-induced intoxication of the defendant is admissible to
prove or negative conduct or to prove state of mind sufficient to establish
an element of an offense. Evidence of self-induced intoxication of the
defendant is not admissible to negative the state of mind sufficient to estab-
lish an element of the offense.
Regarding intoxication evidence, Hawaii prosecutors can have
their cake and eat it too. Hawaii's exclusionary statute authorizes the
State to use intoxication evidence to prove mens rea (presumably in
the context of negligence offenses), but prohibits the defendant from
using it to negate mens rea.
ble to negative the state of mind sufficient to establish an element of the offense.");
IDAHO CODE § 18-116 (1997) ("[A]n intoxicated condition ... may not be taken into
consideration in determining the existence of a mental state which is an element
of the offense .... "); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-2-5 (West Supp. 1997)
("Intoxication ... may not be taken into consideration in determining the existence
of a mental state that is an element of the offense ... ."); Mo. REV. STAT. § 562.076(3)
(Supp. 1997) ("Evidence that a person was in a voluntarily intoxicated or drugged
condition may be admissible when otherwise relevant on issues of conduct but in no
event shall it be admissible for the purpose of negating a mental state which is an ele-
ment of the offense."); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 308 (West 1983) ("[Voluntary in-
toxication [is not] a defense to a criminal charge, nor may evidence of such condi-
tion[] be introduced to negative the element of intent of the offense,
except ... whenever it is relevant to reduce murder from a higher degree to a lower
degree of murder.").
176 Compare ARIz. REV. STAT. § 13-503 (Supp. 1997) (precluding use of evidence of
voluntary intoxication to negative requisite mental state), IDAHO CODE § 18-116
(Supp. 1997) (same), IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-25 (West Supp. 1997) (same), Mo. REV.
STAT. § 562.076(3) (Supp. 1997) (same), and 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 308 (West
1983) (same), with MONT. CODEANN. § 45-2-203 (1997) (same).
7 Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2024 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in thejudgment).
1 See id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment) ("Comprehended as a meas-
ure redefining mens rea, § 45-2-203 encounters no constitutional shoal. States enjoy
wide latitude in defining the elements of criminal offenses....").
179 HAw. REV. STAT. § 702-230(2) (1993) (emphasis added).
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Central to justice Ginsburg's Egelhoff concurrence was the fact,
urged by Montana and amici, that Montana's exclusionary statute
"'extract[s] the entire subject of voluntary intoxication from the mens
rea inquiry,' thereby rendering evidence of voluntary intoxication
logically irrelevant to proof of the requisite mental state."80 No such
extraction occurs under Hawaii's exclusionary statute. Instead, the
plain language of Hawaii's exclusionary statute deems intoxication
evidence relevant to the mens rea inquiry.'8 ' In light of this legislative
determination, the only plausible explanation for Hawaii's prohibi-
tion on defendant-offered intoxication evidence is to improve the
State's chances of winning a conviction.1 2 As argued above, this is an
illegitimate purpose for excluding relevant exculpatory evidence.ss
Furthermore, the operation of Hawaii's exclusionary statute dem-
onstrates a flaw injustice Ginsburg's reasoning in Egelhoff. According
to Justice Ginsburg, a state may not exclude intoxication evidence un-
less it redefines its substantive law by extracting intoxication evidence
from the entire mens rea inquiry. Hawaii's statute plainly does not
do this. Therefore, Justice Ginsburg presumably would distinguish
Hawaii's statute from Montana's, concluding that the former is an
unconstitutional evidentiary proscription. This is problematic be-
cause, as discussed below, the operative effect of the Montana and
Hawaii statutes is the same.
On its face, Hawaii's statute seems less fair to intoxicated wrong-
doers than does Montana's; Montana's statute prohibits both the
State and the defendant from offering intoxication evidence on the
issue of mens rea. However, Hawaii's exclusionary statute is less fair
than Montana's only in its operation over the run of cases--it allows in-
toxication evidence to prove mens rea in one case and prohibits it
from negating mens rea in another. From the perspective of any par-
ticular defendant, Hawaii's statute will operate in precisely the same
"0 Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2024 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting
Reply Brief for Petitioner [State of Montana] at 2 (No. 95-566)).
'81 See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
182 Cf supra notes 146-48 and accompanying text. It should be noted that this
reading of Hawaii's exclusionary statute is contrary to that of the state's high court. In
State v. Souza, 813 P.2d 1384, 1386 (Haw. 1991), the Supreme Court of Hawaii held the
statute constitutional based on its determination that the statute redefines the mens
rea element of all state crimes. The court's one-page analysis of the statute's constitu-
tionality does not address the fact that the statute permits the introduction of intoxica-
tion evidence to prove mens rea. Given the opinions in Egelhoff, it is safe to assume
that the Souza court's analysis is incomplete, to say the least.
's' See supra Part III.C.2.d.
SeeEgelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2024 (Ginsburg,J., concurring in the judgment).
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manner as Montana's; the exclusionary effect of the two statutes is the
same. No single defendant will experience the unfairness of Hawaii's
double standard for intoxication evidence because in no single case
will a defendant's intoxication evidence be barred and the prosecu-
tion's admitted."'
The unfairness of Hawaii's exclusionary statute stems from the
unequal manner in which intoxication evidence is treated-
admissible when offered by the State and inadmissible when offered
by the defendant. Such a claim, if cognizable, falls under the Equal
Protection Clause, not the Due Process Clause. Therefore, the due
process analysis does not turn on whether or not intoxication evi-
dence is extracted from the entire mens rea inquiry.
How does this undermine Justice Ginsburg's reasoning in Egel-
hoff. Because Montana's implicit redefinition and Hawaii's eviden-
tiary proscription operate identically to curtail due process from the
perspective of any individual defendant, Justice Ginsburg erred in
positing a constitutionally redeeming distinction between an implicit
redefinition and an evidentiary proscription. Both readings of Mon-
tana's exclusionary statute violate due process in precisely the same
way: They exclude evidence that is admittedly relevant to the subjec-
tive mens rea element of the charged offense.1
8 6
B. Proscription by Judicial Interpretation of a General Statutory Provision
Courts in Arkansas, Delaware, Georgia, and Texas have inter-
preted statutes providing or implying that intoxication is "no defense"
to a criminal charge as meaning that the jury may not consider in-
'" To understand this, one must think about the types of cases in which Hawaii's
statute is likely to be invoked. The defendant will seek to introduce intoxication evi-
dence only in prosecutions of subjective mens rea offenses. The defendant has no use
for intoxication evidence in prosecutions of negligence offenses, because being in-
toxicated is itself negligent. The State, however, is likely to introduce intoxication evi-
dence only in prosecutions of negligence offenses, because its use in subjective mens
rea offenses is logically mitigatory.
Therefore, in all prosecutions for subjective mens rea offenses, the defendant is
prohibited from introducing intoxication evidence on the issue of mens rea and the
State has no reason to introduce such evidence. This is precisely the operative effect
of Montana's exclusionary statute.
186 To insist that intoxication evidence is irrelevant under Montana's "redefinition"
of its substantive law is to adopt the nonsensical position that Montana has established
a crime of negligent deliberate homicide. See supra Part III.C.I.b. It is important to
note that not all redefinitions would operate identically to evidentiary proscriptions,
and therefore violate due process. For instance, a redefinition that establishes an ob-
jective mens rea element would not violate due process. See infra Part V.
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toxication evidence to negate mens rea.18 7 Does a statute that pro-
vides that intoxication "is not a defense" merely prohibit the defen-
dant from asserting intoxication evidence as an affirmative defense?
Or does it also prohibit the defendant from using intoxication evi-
dence to rebut the prosecution's prima facie case?
In Egelhoff, prohibiting the jury from considering intoxication
evidence to negate mens rea had specific statutory supportee Even
so, the Court held that due process requires that an exclusionary stat-
ute effectuate an (at least) implicit redefinition of the state's substan-
tive law.' 9 In the case of general statutory provisions, the link be-
tween the statute and the conclusion that intoxicatioi evidence
cannot negate mens rea is more tenuous. Given Egelhoff s recognition
of implicit redefinitions, however, it does not appear that such a di-
rect link between the statute and the redefinition is necessary to con-
clude that intoxication evidence is inadmissible to negate mens rea.
The pivotal question in these cases is one of statutory construc-
tion. Under Egelhoff, if the interpreting court determines that the leg-
islature has even implicitly redefined the substantive law, there will be
no due process violation. Although Egelhoff sets a low due process
hurdle, a review of state court cases interpreting general statutory
provisions shows that courts' inquiries into statutory meaning and leg-
islative intent have been less than probing.
For instance, when faced with a challenge similar to that raised in
Egeihoff, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals "interpreted" section
8.04 of the Texas Penal Code, which provides that intoxication is no
defense to crime, 9' this way: "Appellant argues that intoxication
" See White v. State, 717 S.W.2d 784, 786-88 (Ark. 1986) (interpretingARK. CODE
ANN. § 5-2-207 (Michie 1992), which provides that "[i]ntoxication that is not
self-induced is an affirmative defense to a prosecution if [the defendant] lack[ed the]
capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law or to appreciate the
criminality of his conduct"); Wyant v. State, 519 A.2d 649, 650-60 (Del. 1986)
(interpreting DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 421 (1994), which provides that "[voluntary
intoxication] is no defense to any criminal charge"); Foster v. State, 374 S.E.2d 188,
195-96 (Ga. 1988) (interpreting GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-4(c) (1996), which provides
that "[v]oluntary intoxication shall not be an excuse for any criminal act or omis-
sion"); McElroy v. State, 528 S.W.2d 831, 834 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975) (interpreting
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.04(a) (West 1990), which provides that "[v]oluntary intoxi-
cation does not constitute a defense to the commission of crime").
' SeeMONT. CODEANN. § 45-2-203 (1997).
189 See Egeihoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2024 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment)
(noting that the statute at issue could be interpreted as a redefinition of mens rea).
,' See TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.04(a) ("Voluntary intoxication does not consti-
tute a defense to the commission of crime.").
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could bear on the ability to form the intent to commit an act, and the
jury should be so instructed. The jury was instructed in accordance
with [section 8.04]. No error is shown."'9' Other courts have been
considerably more thorough, investigating the legislative history of
the general statutory provisions and considering other documenta-
tion showing legislative intent. '
The point here is not to question the correctness of these deci-
sions, but rather to highlight the dangers that lie in inferring redefi-
nitions of substantive criminal law from general statutory provisions
prohibiting intoxication as a "defense." There is frequently insuffi-
cient evidence of legislative intent to determine the intended extent
of the statutory provision, and at least some courts have been reluc-
tant to engage in anything beyond a cursory interpretation of the
general statutes. Given the liberty interests at stake, courts should be
particularly wary of interpreting general statutory provisions as sweep-
ing redefinitions of a state's substantive criminal law.
C. Proscription by Judicial Decision
In the absence of statutory authority, courts in Mississippi, South
Carolina, and Virginia have held that evidence of intoxication cannot
negate mens rea.' 93 These judge-made exclusionary schemes operate
as straightforward evidentiary proscriptions; in no sense has the legis-
lature redefined the state's substantive criminal law. Therefore, Egel-
hoff s requirement of a redefinition of a state's substantive law places
the constitutionality of these exclusionary schemes in doubt.'9 To
suggest that a court may redefine the state's substantive criminal law
and apply the newly redefined offense in the case before it is to for-
sake the fundamental constitutional principles of separation of pow-
191 McElroy, 528 S.W.2d at 834.
192 See, e.g., Whit 717 S.W.2d at 786-88 (interpreting section 5-2-207 of the Arkan-
sas Code in light of an "emergency clause" which clarified the intent of the legisla-
ture); Wyant, 519 A.2d at 654-59 (interpreting title 21, section 421 of the Deleware
Code in light of three previous versions of that statute).
,93 See Lee v. State, 403 So. 2d 132, 134 (Miss. 1981) (holding that voluntary intoxi-
cation is no defense even to specific intent crimes); State v. Vaughn, 232 S.E.2d 328,
330-31 (S.C. 1977) ("[Violuntary intoxication, where it has not produced permanent
insanity, is never an excuse for or a defense to crime, regardless of whether the intent
involved be general or specific."); Gills v. Commonwealth, 126 S.E. 51, 53-54 (Va.
1925) ("Voluntary drunkenness... is never an excuse for crime; except, where a party
is charged with murder, if it appear that the accused was too drunk to be capable
of... premeditating....").
" See supra Part III.B.2, C.
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ers 95 and the prohibition of ex post facto laws. 96 For present pur-
poses, I will focus not on these constitutional arguments, but rather
on the policy arguments against judicially created exclusionary
schemes.
Judicially created exclusionary schemes should raise concern be-
cause, like judicial recognitions of implicit redefinitions, they insulate
criminalization judgments from political debate.' 9 When the judici-
ary creates an exclusionary scheme without statutory authority, the in-
sulation effect is exacerbated. Courts that ins:itute exclusionary
schemes not only suppress the policy debates underlying criminaliza-
tionjudgments, they usurp the criminalization decision from the state
legislatures. Legislatures, unlike courts, can employ the powerful
mechanisms of affirmative fact gathering, debate, and amendment to
reach a criminalization decision. Although it is true that state judici-
aries may be politically accountable to some extent, they clearly are
institutionally less competent than state legislatures to determine
whether or not an offender's intoxication should bear on his criminal
liability.
Moreover, courts may not recognize the due process concerns at
stake when they promulgate exclusionary schemes. This concern is
borne out in Mississippi. Until 1978, Mississippi followed the com-
mon law rule that intoxication may negate the mens rea element of
... The Constitution of the State of Mississippi, for example, provides that:
The powers of the government of the state of Mississippi shall be divided
into three distinct departments, and each of them confided to a separate
magistracy, to-wit those which are legislative to one, those which are judicial
to another, and those which are executive to another.
No person or collection of persons, being one or belonging to one of
these departments, shall exercise any power properly belonging to either of
the others.
MISS. CONST. art. I, §§ 1-2; see alsoS.C. CONST. art. I., § 8 ("In the government of this
State, the legislative, executive, andjudicial powers of the government shall be forever
separate and distinct from each other, and no person or persons exercising the func-
tions of one of said departments shall assume or discharge the duties of any other.");
VA. CoNST. art. I, § 5 ("[Tlhe legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the
Commonwealth should be separate and distinct. .. ").
1 See MISS. CONST. art. III, § 16 (prohibiting ex post facto laws); S.C. CONST. art I,
§ 4 (same); VA. CONST. art 1, § 9 (same).
197 See supra Part III.C.2.e.
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specific intent crimes 98 In McDaniel v. State,'" decided in 1978, the
Supreme Court of Mississippi adopted a new rule:
If a defendant, when sober, is capable of distinguishing between right
and wrong, and the defendant voluntarily deprives himself of the ability
to distinguish between right and wrong by reason of becoming intoxi-
cated and commits an offense while in that condition, he is criminally
responsible for such acts.2
In doing so, the court overruled twenty-three of its decisions, dating
back to 1844.21
Although the McDaniel rule reads as if it was intended to prohibit
202the affirmative defense of intoxication-induced insanity, the defen-
dant in McDaniel raised no such defense. According to the court,
McDaniel's theory at trial was that he "was so intoxicated he could not
form the requisite intent required for the commission of [the of-
fense]. 2°. Instead of treating this as a failure of proof claim offered
to rebut the State's prima facie case, the court characterized it as an
affirmative defense.0 4 After mischaracterizing McDaniel's failure of
proof claim as an affirmative defense, the McDaniel court invoked a
familiar, if conclusory, justification for rendering intoxication irrele-
vant to liability: "[I]f a person casts off the restraints of reason and
consciousness by a voluntary act, no wrong is done to him if he is held
accountable for any crime which he may commit in that condition.
Society is entitled to this protection." 2°5 The crucial point here is that
by not distinguishing between a failure of proof claim and an affirma-
19 See, e.g., Edwards v. State, 174 So. 57, 58 (Miss. 1937) (holding that a jury in-
struction that "voluntary drunkenness is no defense to crime" was erroneous with re-
spect to the specific intent crime of larceny).
"9 356 So. 2d 1151 (Miss. 1978).
2 Id. at 1161 (Sugg, J., specially concurring).
20' See id. (appending a list of cases overruled by the court's decision).
m Compare id., with M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (H.L. 1843)
(articulating the classic test for insanity, which presumes that a defendant is sane until
it is clearly proven that he "was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease
of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did
know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong").
203 McDanie4 356 So. 2d at 1153.
Later decisions by the Supreme Court of Mississippi have confirmed this mis-
characterization. See, e.g., Lee v. State, 403 So. 2d 132, 134 (Miss. 1981) (interpreting
McDaniel to mean that "a defendant, capable of distinguishing between right and
wrong when sober, is not entitled to an instruction submitting to the jury his inability
to form the specific intent to commit an offense because of his voluntary intoxication
at the time the offense was committed").
2D5 McDaniel 356 So. 2d at 1160-61 (SuggJ., specially concurring).
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ive defense, the court never considered whether excluding McDan-
iel's intoxication evidence implicated due process rights.
0 6
Similar short shrift was given to counterbalancing due process
concerns when the Supreme Court of South Carolina, in State v.
Vaughn, established a rule prohibiting the introduction of intoxica-
tion evidence to negate mens rea. In Vaughn, the defendant was
charged with, inter alia, "assault with intent to ravish," a specific in-
tent crime under South Carolina law.208  The question for the Su-
preme Court of South Carolina was whether or not intoxication evi-
dence can negate the specific intent of the crime charged. The court
recognized the majority rule that intoxication can negate specific in-
tent, but rejected that approach, stating:
Reason requires that a man who voluntarily renders himself intoxicated
be no less responsible for his acts while in such condition. To grant
immunity for crimes committed while the perpetrator is in such a volun-
tary state would not only mean that many offenders would go unpun-
ished but would also transgress the principle of personal accountability
which is the bedrock of all law.
2 9
Although the Vaughn court articulately stated its vision of what
"reason requires," the legislature, as an institution, is better equipped
to determine "the principle [s] of personal accountability" than is the
judiciary.2' ° As Justice Ginsburg reiterated in Egelhoff, "[st] ates enjoy
wide latitude in defining the elements of criminal offenses, particu-
larly when determining 'the extent to which moral culpability should
be a prerequisite to conviction of a crime. State courts have never
been similarly recognized as fountains of criminal law. Any other rule
The Supreme Court of Mississippi did face this question in a subsequent case,
where it determined, much as Justice Ginsburg did in Egethoff, that the McDaniel rule
does not eliminate the prosecution's burden of proving intent. See Lee, 403 So. 2d at
134 ("[Voluntary intoxication is not a substitute for intent. Trial courts must remem-
ber that the purpose of the McDaniel rule is to remove voluntary intoxication as a de-
fense, not to provide an affirmative instruction for the state which might mislead ajury
into thinking that it is not necessary to prove intent, when intent is a requisite ingredi-
ent of the offense."). But see supra note 204 (noting conflicting language in the same
decision).
207 232 S.E.2d 328 (S.C. 1977).
20 See id. at 330 ("We are asked to hold that voluntary intoxication is a defense to
crimes requiring proof by the State of specific intent....").
29 Id. at 330-31.
210 Id.
211 Egeihoff 116 . Ct. at 2024-25 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment)
(citations omitted) (quoting Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 545 (1968) (Black, J., con-
curring)).
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would vitiate the constitutional principles of separation of powers and
the prohibition of ex post facto laws.
V. THE OFFENSE OF INTOXICATED CRIMINAL CONDUCT
This Comment does not question the valid interest states have in
punishing intoxicated wrongdoers. The intuitive feeling that an of-
fender's intoxication should not excuse his criminal conduct makes
sense; after all, intoxicated wrongdoers are no less dangerous than
sober offenders. Incapacitation alone might, therefore, justify pun-
ishing many intoxicated wrongdoers to the same extent as sober of-
fenders. In addition, the high incidence of intoxication among vio-
lent offenders, 12 while not necessarily proof of a causal relationship,
probably justifies establishing special rules of criminal liability for in-
toxicated wrongdoers.
Part III of this Comment argued that prohibiting an intoxicated
wrongdoer from introducing intoxication evidence to negate the
mens rea of the charged offense violates due process. Part III also ar-
gued that evidentiary proscriptions should not be considered implicit
redefinitions of a state's substantive criminal law. Moreover, I have
maintained that an explicit redefinition of an offense to render in-
toxication evidence irrelevant to criminal liability would vitiate the
morally compelling, though arguably non-constitutional, culpability
requirement of the criminal law.
How might society constitutionally give effect to the sentiment
expressed by the Mississippi prosecutor whose remark opened this
Comment? The following two-part approach follows from the discus-
sions above: (1) intoxication should be given full demonstrable ex-
culpatory significance in negating any subjective mens rea element of
a charged offense; and (2) separate offenses of intoxicated criminal
conduct (e.g., homicide, endangerment, or destruction) should be
enacted, each providing for a mens rea element of negligence.2
3
212 See, e.g., William F. Wieczorek et al., Alcohol, Drugs and Murder. A Study of Con-
victed Homicide Offenders, 18J. CRIM. JUST. 217, 220 (1990) (finding that 56% of 1887
homicide offenders were under the influence of alcohol or drugs during the commis-
sion of their crimes); Richard M. Yarvis, Patterns of Substance Abuse and Intoxication
Among Murderers, 22 BULL AM. AcAD. PSYCHIATRY& L. 133, 137 (1994) (finding that
48% of 100 convicted murderers were intoxicated during the commission of their
crimes).
213 This approach is not novel. Other commentators have suggested, for varying
reasons, the creation of criminal negligence laws to be applied to intoxicated wrong-
doers. See, e.g., FINGARETTE & HASSE, supra note 75, at 103-04 (desiring a "broadening
of criminal negligence"); THE LAW COMMISSION, CONSULTATION PAPER No. 127:
[Vol. 146:269
INTOXICATED WRONGDOERS
The first part of this proposed approach follows directly from the
due process objections raised in Part III of this Comment. Neither
evidentiary proscriptions nor implicit redefinitions of existing of-
fenses satisfy the due process requirement that a defendant be al-
lowed to introduce reliable exculpatory evidence in his defense.1 4
The first part of this approach admits for the jury's consideration all
logically relevant evidence to determine whether or not the defen-
dant is guilty of the crime charged. 2' 5 Although some commentators
have argued that intoxication has less pharmacological relation to the
216
formation of intent than is generally thought to be the case, such
arguments are properly addressed to juries to rebut defendants' asser-
217tions of putatively exculpatory intoxication evidence. Until medical
science definitively answers such questions, fairness requires that po-
tentially exculpatory evidence not be excluded merely because the
state wishes to make it easier to convict intoxicated wrongdoers.
If the skeptical commentators are correct in their assertion that
intoxicated wrongdoers almost always intend, in a criminally culpable
sense, their actions, admitting intoxication evidence should not
change the result in many prosecutions. In Egelhoff, for example, the
jury was persuaded that the State proved the requisite mens rea be-
yond a reasonable doubt by its presentation of a significant amount of
218evidence. Because proof of mens rea is always circumstantial and
usually inferred from a range of evidence, one more piece of evi-
dence-the defendant's intoxication-is not likely to be determina-
tive. In those cases in which evidence of severe intoxication success-
fully raises a reasonable doubt as to mens rea, the defendant properly
will be acquitted. Moreover, juries will be relieved in all cases from
INTOXICATION AND CRIMINAL LIABIITY 75-94 (1993) [hereinafter LAW COMMISSION
REPORT] (proposing and explaining the offense of "criminal intoxication"). Because
these and other commentators have explored this approach at some length, I will not
duplicate their efforts here. Rather, I wish to show why this approach is the only per-
missible one given the due process concerns presented in this Comment.
214 See supra Part III.C.
215 See supra Part III.C.2.d.
216 See supra note 75.
217 A similar, though more skeptical, suggestion that use of "scientific data on in-
toxication" is a "second best approach" to justice, following minimal inclusion of
medical testimony is made in Chester N. Mitchell, The Intoxicated Offender-Refuting the
Legal and Medical Myths, 11 INT'LJ.L. & PSYCHIATRY 77, 100-03 (1988).
21 See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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the confusing and arbitrary task of considering intoxication evidence
219
on the issue of actus reus but not of mens rea.
The second part of the proposed approach aims to criminalize
the conduct that might otherwise go unpunished in the prosecution
of subjective mens rea offenses. Although a person might be not
guilty of deliberate homicide because he lacked the requisite subjec-
tive mens rea due to severe intoxication, he may nevertheless be
guilty of intoxicated homicide, which would require a mens rea of
only negligence.
Creating a separate offense requiring a mens rea of negligence
clearly distinguishes the two countervailing concerns that are at stake
with intoxicated wrongdoers: that negligent offenders should not be
punished as deliberate offenders, and that negligent offenders de-
serve some amount of punishment. This approach properly recog-
nizes that, although subjective mens rea may be lacking, severely in-
toxicated wrongdoers are culpably negligent for voluntarily assuming
a condition making criminal behavior more likely, and should be
punished accordingly. This approach eschews the fiction of the neg-
ligent deliberate offender; it forces society to make criminalization
judgments openly on the legislature's floor, subject to the ameliora-
tive effects of political debate, rather than through the back door of
implicit redefinitions, evidentiary proscriptions, judges' wisdom, or
common law tradition.
The level of punishment for intoxicated criminal conduct cer-
tainly is a crucial issue. This Comment has argued that the legislature
is the proper institution to determine offenders' criminal responsibil-
ity. Although negligence offenses typically carry a less severe pun-
ishment than deliberate offenses,2° it does not appear that the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments requires
such treatment.2' The British Law Commission, in a report discuss-
ing the creation of a criminal intoxication offense similar to that pro-
posed here, forcefully stated that it
219 Montana law, for instance, allows intoxication evidence to be introduced on the
issue of whether the defendant was capable of performing the actus reus of the of-
fense charged. See Brief for Petitioner [State of Montana] at 9-10, Montana v.
Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. 2013 (1996) (No. 95-566).
o Compare 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 106(b) (6), 2504 (providing a maximum
sentence of five years' imprisonment for involuntary manslaughter), with id. § 1102
(providing a sentence of death or life imprisonment for first-degree murder).
221 See Harmelin v. Michigan,'501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991) ("The Eighth Amendment




regard[s] as unacceptable the suggestion that there should be the same
maximum punishment for the intoxication offence as for [the applica-
ble offense if the defendant had acted while sober].... Although the
basis of the intoxication offence is that the defendant was at fault in be-
coming intoxicated in the first place, that fault is of a more general and
less obviously culpable nature than the fault, the intentional or reckless
commission of a defined criminal act, that founds liability for the
[otherwise applicable offense]. It would not be right to put the two
cases on the same level in respect of punishment.
Although other influential commentators have expressed similar
convictions, criminalization judgments-within the due process
constraints discussed above 224-ultimately should be left to the legisla-
tive process. Requiring the legislature to face the criminalization
question candidly may itself lead the legislature to differentiate the
punishment of an intoxicated, negligent offender and a deliberate
offender. If it does not, at least the intoxicated wrongdoer will be
treated fairly, if harshly.
CONCLUSION
The Due Process Clause memorializes the social judgment that
not every means to a permissible end is just. Intoxicated wrongdoers,
like all criminal defendants, depend on thatjudgment to secure their
right to a fair opportunity to defend against the state's criminal
charges. If society holds intoxicated wrongdoers criminally liable to
the same extent as sober offenders, it must do so in a manner that
preserves defendants' right to introduce reliable, exculpatory intoxi-
cation evidence. To do otherwise reestablishes "retaliation and
vengeance as the motivation for public prosecution."2"
2 LAW COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 213, at 81.
= See, e.g., Hall, supra note 75, at 1061 ("The solid, unavoidable fact, was that a
harm committed under gross intoxication ought to be clearly distinguished from a like
injury by a sober person.").
22 See supra Part III.C.1.
Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251 (1952).
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